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ABSTRACT
The Idea of ‘Holy Islamic Empire’ as a Catalyst to Muslims’ Response to the Second Crusade
by
Emeel S. Lamey

The oral traditions in the Islamic world presented only the moral benefits of Jihad. Yet, the fact
is that, though the moral benefits continued to exist before and after the First Crusade, though the
interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories continued on,
Muslims did not advance the practical Jihad. Nonetheless, the disastrous Second Crusade struck
a powerful chord among Muslims. It forced Muslims to battle for their very survival, and to do
so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their imperial
inheritance built up over centuries. A number of concerns identified with the “golden age” of the
Islamic empire influenced the Jihad movements for Muslims associated the imperial traditions
with Islam itself. Given the examples of the First and Second Crusades, this study proposes that
the idea of “Islamic Empire” constituted Muslims’ practical response to the crusades.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The impact and repercussions of the First Crusade unleashed brutal and harsh conditions
on Muslims. Just as no other crusade was as victorious as this one, so too the Islamic world felt
its effects more profoundly than any other crusading campaign. Notwithstanding the loss of
Jerusalem and the Holy Land, and despite the campaign’s brutality, Muslims accustomed
themselves to the crusader presence in their lands. It is clear that although the Second Crusade
was to follow, it did not result in any territorial losses or in any major damage to the Islamic
world. In outcome, although the impact of the triumphant First Crusade imposed harsher
conditions on Muslims that should have provoked Muslims to embrace the holy war concept of
Jihad, it was the impact of the fiascoes of the Second Crusade that struck a powerful chord to the
forces of Islam. Scholars tend to credit the suitable environment of retaking Jerusalem to the
activities of Nur-ad-Din. Although vital, Nur-ad-Din’s success lay in the newly interconnected
practical and theoretical aspects of Jihad brought about by a new sense of pan-Islamism. This
new sense was the direct result to the outcome of the Second Crusade revitalizing Muslims’
nostalgia of ‘Holy Islamic Empire.’ In the case of both the First and Second Crusades, Muslim
juries provided religious theories to justify Jihad as a counter-response. Nonetheless, the impact
of the Second Crusade encouraged Muslims of all social classes to unite their efforts under the
state’s authority. This step, coupled with aspirations to bring back the ‘Mighty Islamic Empire’,
brought about the practicality to the Jihad.
The Second Crusade has fared poorly by contrast to the legendary First Crusade, which
succeeded in taking Jerusalem from the Muslims and the thrilling Third Crusade, which was
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dominated by the heroics of Richard the Loinheart and Saladin. The facts – that the First
Crusade conquered Jerusalem and that the Third Crusade made wide progress in the recovery of
the Holy Land – encouraged chroniclers to focus on these two campaigns. By comparison, due
to the failure of the Second Crusade, narrative western chroniclers poorly served it. It seemed
that chroniclers had no interest in recording the events of such a failure, with the exception of
Otto of Freising’s and Odo of Deuil’s accounts. By contrast, Muslim’s triumph in the Second
Crusade encouraged chroniclers like Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Qalinisi to record the events of their
success. Although the Second Crusade obtained less attention than the First and the Third
Crusades, it marked significant developments in the organization of the crusades. For example,
it was the first time that two European monarchs left their kingdoms and carried the cross toward
the Holy Land. The Second Crusade witnessed also the issue of Quantum Praedecessores,
which represented the most organized papal authorization of preaching the crusade.
The study of the holy war, in general, and its history appears to be in vigorous condition;
numerous work, both academic and popular, are published each year and there is an ongoing and
energetic debate concerning the extent and the definitions of ‘crusading’ and ‘countercrusading.’ These studies are, after all, of direct relevance to a clearer understanding of the longterm perception of the holy war and they shed light on the relationship between the Islamic world
and the West. This point, more decisively, indicates that political and ideological ethics
concerning the holy war influenced scholars’ approaches, above all, the legitimacy of using force
to promote even worthy and legitimate causes.

6

From 1095 until the fourteenth century, scholars took an intrinsicist 1 approach to the
phenomenon of crusading and counter-crusading. The constant tensions, threats, and religious
fervor between western Christendom and the Islamic world influenced scholars’ interest in
promoting worthy and legitimate causes for the war. This approach criticizes the issue of the
war from the viewpoint that there are certain acts that are good or bad in themselves, regardless
of the consequences of these acts. Scholars who took this approach confirm the issue of jus ad
bellum that war must have a just cause, legitimate authority and righteous intentions, in order to
be moral, though each one chose a one-sided viewpoint concerning the issue of war morality. 2
Although written from different viewpoints and offered varying terminology and biblical
passages, almost all Latin historians and chroniclers of the expeditions that were later called the
First and Second Crusades considered them legitimate holy responses to the Muslim or the socalled infidels’ threat to Christian holy places.3 On the other hand, almost all Muslim historians

The author translated documents in foreign languages into English.
1
The philosophical definition ‘intrinsic’ points to a semiconductor in which the
concentration of charge-carriers is characteristic of the material itself regardless of any content of
impurities it contains.
2
On the Just war theory in medieval western Christendom, see Thomas Aquianos,
Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Vol. II, III vols. (New
York: Benziger Brothers), Question 40; John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of
Just War (New York: Continuum, 2006); On Just War theory in medieval Islam see John Kelsay,
Arguing the Just War in Islam (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 97-124; John
Kelsay, "Religion, Morality, and the Governance of War: The Case of Classical Islam," Journal
of Religious Ethics 18, no. 2 (1990): 123-139.
3 For ideas of Latin chroniclers and the ways they used to justify the act of using force
against Muslims see Jonathan Riley-Smith, What were The Crusades?, 3rd (Bloomington, IN:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 12-37; C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of Crusade, trans. M.
Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 8, 349; J. Flori,
"Guerre sainte et rètributions spirituelles dans la 2e moitiè du XIe siècle," Revue d'histoire
ecclèsiastique 85 (1990): 627-628; For examples of scholars attitude toward war against
Muslims in the fourteenth-century see Don Juan Manuel, Libro de los estados, ed. R. B. Tate and
I. R. MacPherson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 53; V. Cantarino, "the Spanish
Reconquest: A Clunic Holy War Against Islam?," in Islam and Medieval West: Aspects of
Intercultural Relations, ed. K. I. Semaan (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1980), 98.
7

and chroniclers viewed the crusades as an act of evil, although written from different viewpoints
and for distinctive interests. While Latin scholars denied Muslims’ legitimacy of using force,
Muslim scholars elevated the act of war against the so-called polytheists’ encroachments to the
level of holy duties against evil.4 There is no doubt that both sides questioned the applications of
war morality, although each side was concerned by the illegitimacy in the act of the opposite
one, thus each side brought different ideologies to justify the legitimacy of its own war.
In the fifteenth-century, Muslims – specifically the Ottoman Turks – were a continuing
threat to Western Europe and the defense of Christendom was seen as a pressing concern in the
west. The fall of Byzantium in 1453, in addition to the continued expansions of the Turks at the
expense of the purported Christian lands, influenced the constancy of the intrinsicist approaches
in humanists’ rhetoric. Literally, humanists regarded the illegitimacy in the Muslim Turks’ act
of war, thus they deliberated the legitimacy of Europeans using force in the form of a crusade
against Muslims. Remarkably, secular discussions of culture and politics supplemented
humanists' visions. This is not to imply that humanists rejected the religious rhetoric of the holy
war completely. Given the Greek and Roman foundations, humanists addressed the topic of the
Turks and crusade in classical terms. Rather than using the language of religion or chivalry,
humanists justified European armed responses to the Turks’ threat by drawing a new image of
Muslims in the form of replicas of the ancient barbarians, nomadic and destructive hordes upon
great civilizations only to destroy their western cultures. Like in ancient Rome, this image
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See Ibn al-Athir referring to the Crusades as a form of Christian holy war aimed at
Islam and urging a Muslim counter-crusade in Ibn al-Athir, The Chronicles of Ibn al-Athir for
The Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-Taa'rikh, trans. D. S. Richards, Vol. 1, III vols.
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 13; see al-Sulami urging Muslims to
elevate the concept of Jihad to the distruction of the polytheists (in referring to Crusaders)
Emmanuel Sivan, "La genese de la contre-croisade," Journal Asiatique (La Societe Asiatique)
254 (1966): 199-204.
8

justified not only using force to promote legitimate reasons, or even denying Muslims’
legitimacy in response, but also added a secular task on the crusade as a mission aimed at
civilizing the barbarians. 5
The Ottoman Turks, for their side, tended to move into the glorious past of the Islamic
empire. From their perspective, the Ottomans aimed their counter-crusading propagandas at
gaining solid ground of legitimate authority in the Muslim world, thus they tried to fit their
struggle against Europeans in the image of that of Saladin or the Great Caliphs as defenders of
Islam. They mobilized religious sentiments to their political expansion on the European
continent, a holy mission against the crusades that transformed their status in the Muslim world
from gazis ‘conquerors’ into mujahedeen ‘holy warriors.’ However, this came at a high cost on
the Islamic world. During their struggle with western Christendom, and since Selim the
Conqueror occupied Arab lands, the Arab world suffered from an extreme neglect. The Ottoman
rule enforced a steady and general decline on Arab societies, a policy to protect their territories
from future crusades. The result of this isolationism was extremely harmful to the Muslim
world. Denied interactions with the outside world, the Middle East lacked the developing and
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For examples of humanists’ perception of the Ottoman Turks see Leonardo Bruni, The
Humanism of Leonardo Bruni, trans. and ed. Gordon Griffith, James Hankins and David
Thompson (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Society of America , 1987), 183; For
Western reaction to the fall of Constantinople see Robert Schwoebel, The Shadow of the
Crescent: The renaissance Image of The Turks 1453-1517 (NewYork: St. Martin's Press, 1967),
chapter 1, 164-165; For humanist writing on crusade and the Turks see James Hankins,
"Rensaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the Age of Mohmed II," Dumberton
Oaks papers 49 (1995): 111-207; see also Norman Housley, The Later Crusades, 1274- 1580:
From Lyons to Alcazar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
9

the production of scholarship. Consequently, Middle Eastern studies on the Crusades suffered a
standstill from the fifteenth-century down until the first light of the twentieth-century.6
Between the sixteenth and the seventieth centuries, Europe witnessed scholars’ constancy
in using the intrinsicist approaches toward the applications of war morality. During the
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and down into the Civil War in England the issue turned
into fierce controversies between Protestant and Catholic. While Catholics viewed the issue of
the crusades as a force for good, Protestants regarded Catholic crusades as the evil arm of the
papacy. They argued that the papacy had no legitimate authority to issue such a war. In return,
Protestants branded Catholic wars as an immoral reaction to humanity. Although this argument
would consider Muslims’ legitimacy of using force against such illegitimate war, Protestants
used some rhetoric polemics against the Turks. Protestants approached the issue of the war
morality from their own side only. They saw themselves as soldiers of Christ fighting a holy,
just, and legitimate war in defense of Christianity against the forces of evil, regardless of the
consequences. As a result, each side promoted only its own use of force and denied the
opposites’ legitimacy of using force.7

6

Stanford Jay Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1 (New
York: cambridge University Press, 1976), 55-111; Stephen Turnbull, The Ottoman Empire,
1326- 1699 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing LTD, 2003), 22-67; Jane Hathaway and Karl K. Barber,
The Arab Land Under Ottoman rule, 1516- 1800 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan,
2008); see also Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
Inc., 1993), 72-84.
7
For Catholic and Protestant ideologies of each legitimacy of using force see P. Rousset,
"L' idèologie de croisade dans les guerres de religion au XVIe siècle," SZG 31 (1981): 174-184;
For an example of a Protostant scholar writing strongly anti-Catholic and anti-Turks see J. E.
Baily, The Life of Thomas Fuller D. D. (Manchester , London: Unwin Brothers Printers, 1874),
173-181; For Catholic defense of crusading ideology see E. A. R. Brown, "A Sixteenth-Century
Defense of Saint Louis' Crusades: Etienne le Blanc and the Legacy of Louis IX," in Cross
Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period: Essays Presented To Aryeh Grabois on His
10

Nonetheless, the end of the seventieth-century witnessed the impact of a wave of
secularism on European societies. This marked a new phase in western scholars’ approach
toward the applications of morality in wars, especially, religiously ones. For the first time,
scholars started to observe the issue of religious violence as a part of history, which needs to be
perceived, rather than a part of the history, which they live. It seems that the decline of
Ottomans’ threat brought about a state of self-confidence and ended the condition of perceiving
the issue of Muslim responses under the hazard. In outcome, the age of secularism overlapped
the age of religious violence. In return, new skeptic approaches overlapped the old intrinsic
ones. Skeptical scholars would rather not engage in the quest of war morality. Thus, they prefer
to use primary sources, but without any further interpretation to the events. Their doubts in the
bellum itself brought a notion of disbelieving in any applications of morality or justification in
wars. In return, their studies either favored to show sympathies to all victims of war or avoided
engaging in the issue. For example, Thomas Fuller published an anti-Catholic Historie de
croisade in 1670. In this publication Fuller provides a trace of a new skeptical attitude of
perceiving the past, but with a tendency and favor toward his Christian ‘Protestant’ identity,
which points to the intrinsicist approach. Meanwhile, his hesitation and enthusiasm toward the
applications of violence in both sides confirms the new skeptical approach. Thus, it would be
true to say that although Fuller’s study tended to view Muslims as victims of crusaders’ greed,
his religious zeal denied Muslims’ right to use force in respond to the crusades.8
In the eighteenth-century, a number of events had turned in Europe, which marked a new
tide of scholarly opinions. The total decline of the Ottoman Empire marked the end of the soSixty-fifth Birthday, ed. M. Goodich, S. Menache and S. Schein, (New York: Peter Lang
Publishing, 1995), 21-48.
8
Heinrich Von Sybel, The History and Literature of the Crusades, trans. L. D. Gordon
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1861), 163-164.
11

called Muslims’ threat to Europe. In retrospect, rationalist writers brought about a gradual shift
into more liberal thinking in the age of enlightenment. They tended to view the war as immoral,
worldly motivated enterprises, and inspired by religious zeal. At this stage, scholars doubted the
existence of any form of morality or justifications in a war. In return, doubts in the legitimacy of
using force fueled scholars’ skeptical approaches. For example, in 1751, Voltaire commented on
the crusades, “[the crusades were] the thirst for brigandage.”9 Gibbon, as well, called the
crusades, “savage fanaticism.”10 In addition, the impact of the French revolution ideals
influenced enlightenment scholars to associate the use of force with the illegitimate tyrannical
authority. 11 Certainly, this idea applies not only on the crusades but also on Muslims’ countercrusades.
By this time the industrial revolution had widened the technological gap between
Western Europe and the rest of the world, including the Middle East. This gap ushered in the
late eighteenth-century and continued toward the early nineteenth-century, in which a new era of
European colonization occurred. Influenced by secular ideals and a great enthusiasm toward
medieval literature, rationalists and romanticists, secularly, associated the age of European
colonization with the age of the crusades. In response, the memories of the crusades brought a
sympathetic attitude toward the Middle East, yet in skeptical approaches. Instead of engaging
into the argument of war morality, rationalists favored the depictions of the war in romantic
literature, art, and music. In return, speaking of the crusades, romanticists and rationalists drew a
9

Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, in Oeuvres complète de Voltaire, ed. L. Moland, Vol. 54
(Paris: Garnier Frères, 1877-1885) 11:442.
10
E. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. D.
Womersley (London, 1994), chp. 61: 3:727.
11
See Emerson comments in his journal that the crusades took their place among the
monuments of folly and tyranny in W. Gilman and A. Ferguson ed., The Journals and
Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson 1826-1900, Vol. 3 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1963), 18.
12

fantasy image of sympathies toward all war victims and heroes, especially Muslims, as
rationalists considered Muslims, victims of the Crusaders’ fanaticism, although rationalists
placed no reference toward the rights of a victim to respond to aggressors. The best example of
which sympathies toward the Middle East is seen in the novel of Sir Walter Scott, The Talisman,
in which he described the piety and heroics of Saladin.12
In the early nineteenth-century, western studies started to consider the importance of
Muslim accounts of the crusades, although these studies treated Muslim’s accounts with a
skeptical attitude. The publication of The Recuiel des historien des croisade struck a more
serious scholarly note. This publication includes editions of primary sources in Latin, Greek,
and most importantly, Arabic entitled Le Livre Des Deux Jardins, Histoire Des Deux Regnes,
Celui De Nour Ed-Din Et Celui De Salah Ed-Din.13 Although the study considered the
importance of Muslim sources, it did not provide any further interpretation to the Islamic
perspective of the crusade. No wonder, the major body of the early studies of the Muslim’s part
of the crusades tended to aim at the broad aspect of Saladin’s part in Muslims’ countercrusading. The influence of rationalists – in addition to the heroics of Saladin and Richard the
Lionheart during the Third Crusade – encouraged scholars to focus on Saladin’s role of returning
Jerusalem to the Muslims.

12

Sir Walter Scott, The Talisman, ed. Dwight Holbrook (Boston: Ginn & Company
Publishers, 1895); for more evidances of rationals’ sympathies toward the medieval lierature and
the Middle East see J. Dakyns, The Middle Ages in French Literature, 1851-1900 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 1-28; see Gibbon and Mohammed in Bernard Lewis, Islam and
the West, 85-98.
13
Receuil, Des Historiens des Croisades, Historians orientaux, Vol. Tome V (Paris: Les
Soins De L'Academie des Inscription et Belles-Littres, 1876); see also H. Deherain, “Les
Orignes du recueil des Historiens des croisades,” JSav, n.s., 17 (1919): 260-266.
13

As a result, toward the eve of the twentieth-century, Muslims’ perspective studies
contributed more to the heroics of Saladin, yet still in skeptical attitude. In 1907, W. B.
Stevenson published, The Crusaders in the East. In this study, Stevenson places his emphasis on
the Muslims’ side at the age of the Crusades. No wonder, Stevenson’s study aimed heavily at
the heroics of Saladin as a part of Muslims’ reaction toward Crusaders’ existence in the East.
Although Stevenson’s study attempted to use primary sources from both Europeans’ and
Muslims’ sides, his study avoided emphasis to Muslims’ counter-crusade movements. It seems
that Stevenson’s sympathetic attitude toward the Middle East at the peak of Western colonization
influenced his engagement in the quest of war morality, though his study avoided criticizing the
war ideology neither that of crusading nor Muslim counter-crusading.14
Skeptical approaches continued further throughout the twentieth-century, some times in
the shadow of the Marxists theory. By which, scholars tended to evaluate Muslim’ response to
the crusades from the viewpoint of whether (or not) the response represented a Muslim leader
whose reaction to the crusades favored the needs of the poorer class or in favor of the greedy
needs of the nobility class. In 1967, N. Elisseeff published the best example of this approach.
Elisseff wrote a three-volume monograph in French entitled, Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince
musulman de Syrie au temps des Croisades. In this study, Elisseeff provides a biographical work
of Nur-ad-Din. Elisseff elevated the image of Nur-ad-Din from a Muslim warlord into the leader

14

William. B. Stevenson, The Crusaders in the East: A Breif History of the Wars of Islam
with the Latins of Syria during the twelfth and thirteenth centuaries (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1907; G. le Strange, Review of the Crusaders in the East by W. B. Stevenson,
The English Historical Review (Oxford University Press) 23, no. 90 (Apr. 1908), 346-47.
14

who brought about the rights of the poor. Yet, Elisseeff’s study did not offer a full assessment of
the key figure of Muslims’ counter-crusade.15
Certainly, religion provides a strong psychological motivation for wars. Human’s search
for insurance from the mysterious future propels one to establish a good relationship with the
superpower. Above all, higher expectations of salvation fulfill human’s psychological need.
The ideology of the holy war, in return, combines the practical act of war and aims it at earning
the needed salvation. By this ideology, an individual’s worldviews prevail that the act of
fighting grants godly salvation. The term ‘Jihad’ stands to explain this ideology in Islamic
beliefs. Therefore, utilitarian approaches that describe the holy war as one that starts with the
premise of either ‘primarily spiritual’ or ‘primarily materialistic’ are over-simplifications. The
holy war was rather a combination of both. Consequently, materialistic explanations – which
were so influential in the 1950s – are less in evidence. It was actually liberal economic
historians, not Marxist, who preferred materialistic approaches to interpret the holy war, striped
of its ethic, in social and economic terms. 16 They believed that crusading – and obviously
counter-crusading – was an early example of colonialism and assumed that economic forces
could only motivate such powerful movements. Ahead of the list, Joshua Prawer, for whom the
portrayal of the Crusaders as forerunners of colonialism accorded with a Zionist reading of the
history of the Promised Land since the Diaspora.17

15

Nikita Elisseeff, Nur-ad-Din: Un grand prince musulman de Syrie at temps des
Criosades (511 -569 A.H./1118-1174), III vols. (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damascus,
1967).
16
Norman Housley, Contesting The Crusades (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006),
77-78.
17
See summarize of Prawer’s approach in Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades,
Chrestianity, and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 3-4, 60-61; Joshua
15

When it comes to broader trends of economic and social changes, the picture is a little
murkier. The argument that the prime causes for the practical crusading or Jihad were simply
economic and that the prime motivating force was a desire for profit, or at least for an escape
from dire financial circumstances, is vague. Neither imperialism nor Marxism existed in the
medieval world, at least in theories. This might only account for the way critics of too much
realism at the expense of avoiding engagements in the debate that religious ideal provides a
strong motivation for the holy war. What this leaves us with is the pre-eminence of religious
beliefs and values. One advantage of stressing the religious origins of crusading and countercrusading is that it occurs with the picture presented in the sources. Yet, there is admittedly a
danger in pursuing this line of argument of falling into the trap of assuming certain values are
always necessarily paramount.
For example, Emmanuel Sivan published his work L’Islam et La Croisade in 1968.
Although his analysis provides the earliest most important work regarding Muslims’ countercrusading, he took a utilitarian approach.18 By this approach, Sivan tended to deal pragmatically
with the issue of the war. Sivan argues that the serious mobilization of Jihad as a Muslims’
instrument in the war against the Crusades began in the time of Zengi. 19 Practically, Sivan’s
argument holds strong, since Zengi’s move is considered the first Muslim functional response
against the crusades. However, Sivan’s analysis assumed that Zengi’s warfare against the
crusades necessarily reflected religious values. To be sure, the term Jihad demonstrates two
interconnected concepts, holy and war. The first of which, the concept ‘holy’ stands to explain

Prawer, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson Publishing, 1972).
18
Emmanuel Sivan, L'Islam et la Croisade: ideologic et propagande dans les reaction
musulmanes aux Croisades (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1968).
19
Emmanuel Sivan, L'Islam et la Croisade, 44.
16

the theoretical religious coating, which provides the psychological motivation for the general
population to pick up the arms and be a part of the second, which is the practical worldly war. It
seems that Sivan dealt with the relationship between the theory and the practice of Jihad as two
different spheres, rather than as one interacting and mutual sphere.
Not all scholars accept the idealistic defensive practices of a holy war, and many writers
have pointed out the failure of historians to take accounts of psychological and sociological
theories in studying the motivations of the holy war. Psychologically, the ideology of a holy war
stands as the way of resolving the tension, or endemic cognitive dissonance, between religious
ideals and the worldly violence of medieval societies. 20 This ideology combines the theology of
salvation with the practical action of the sword, by which it justifies the war and establishes the
psychological needed good relation with the superpower (God). In sociological outcome, this
sort of integration required Muslim juries to provide logical theories, which offer salvation to
those who decides to fight from the common people. In return, the practical warfare side –
brought about by the political authorities of the state – takes a religious coating. This step alters
the movement from a secular and political war into a combination of holy and just war. For
example, the concept of Jihad at the time of the Crusades should have offered Muslims in
general with the new reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. This
alteration shifts the tiny individual movements into a mass movement because it meets a
widespread psychological need.21

20

In referring to the First Crusade, quoted by J. R. E. Bliese, "The Motives of the First
Crusade: A Social Psychological Analysis," Journal of Psychohistory 17 (1990): 400.
21
For further information on the association of Jihad’s theory and practice in Islamic law,
see Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964- 1986), 6785.
17

The full, composite story of the holy war needs the drawing together of evidences from
both sides of the conflict. Due to the negative impact of isolation for almost five centuries under
Ottoman rule, the Muslim world has approached the phenomenon of the Crusades less globally. 22
Once the Ottoman forces withdrew from the Middle East after their defeat in the First World
War, the Middle East encountered European colonialism. In return, a wave of religious fervor
influenced Middle Eastern approaches toward the phenomenon of the crusades. Western
colonialism brought back to Muslims memories of massacres conducted by the crusades in the
holy land, and the epic of endless battles with the crusaders. In outcome, Middle Eastern studies
tended to move into the past and treated the issue of the crusade as a holy bond between the
present generation and their ancestors. That explains why counter-crusading ideology remained
consistence in the face of a new wave of crusading in referring to colonialists and imperialists.
This attitude associated any form of modern western presence in the Middle East with the
negative memories of the crusades.
That included affiliating the consequences of European colonialism, and the tension
between western and Islamic societies, together with medieval crusading and counter-crusading
propagandas. After all, these ideas shaped the minds of Middle Eastern scholars, who in return
took the intrinsicist approach in the studies of the Crusades. This approach diminished
completely from western scholarships since the end of the seventeenth-century. Fueled with
rising religious fervor and nationalists’ identity, Middle Eastern scholars dealt with the crusades
as an act of evil and justified all forms of Islamic response. In 1972, the Syrian scholar Zakkar
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published a two-part work in Arabic entitled, the Crusading wars (al-Hurub al-Salibiyya).23
Rather than a scholarly work, the study provides an anachronistic nationalist viewpoint. It
evaluated Muslims’ counter-crusading phenomenon in the light of recent Middle-Eastern
experiences, as far as Arab nationalism, the establishment of the State of Israel, the liberation of
Palestine and the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism. Zakkar’s study brought about the
legitimacy of Muslims response to modern western encroachment, which he referred to by the
definition, ‘Crusade.’
Down into the late twentieth century in the Middle East, the rise of political Islamism –
and the ideologies of justifying acts of extreme violence has on it the stamp of the early Middle
Eastern twentieth century’ association of crusading ideas and imperialism – has left a wary
impact on Middle Eastern scholars of the crusades, perhaps until today. The spread of political
Islamist’s ideas raised an issue of suspicion in the Middle East. In retrospect, Middle Eastern
scholars tended to avoid criticizing Muslims’ response to the crusades because Islamists were
likely to view any balanced study as an act of supporting western ideals, which they labeled as a
crusade aimed at the destruction of Islamic ideals.24 This, in return, brought about the skeptical
approaches to Middle Eastern scholars who contributed to the topic in later time. Not long after
Zukkar’s study, in 1984, Amin Maalouf published another Middle-Eastern approach of the
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Crusades entitled, The Crusades through Arab Eyes.25 Unfortunately, Maalouf’s study lives up
to its title, although it depends heavily on major Arabic sources, it contains a drawback of a
general narrative to Muslims’ counter-crusading movements but without furnishing new
information or even new interpretation. Apparently, Maalouf’s experience of a sectarian war in
Lebanon, in addition to fundamental Islamists’ suspicions influenced his doubts in the legitimacy
of any form of war. Therefore, his study avoids his personal judgment on Muslims’ countercrusades movements.26
Political and ideological concerns still influence interest in the crusades today, including
the consequences of European colonialism, western imperialism, and East-West tensions. Over
the last two decades, western scholars well regarded the phenomenon of the crusades and its
Muslim counter-crusades. The major body of recent studies tended to look at the topic of the
crusades and their Muslim counterpart with consequentlist approaches. The rising tide of
criticism influenced this approach. Given the difficulty to understand the morality of wars from
one viewpoint, consequentlist scholars aimed at criticizing the consequences, which led to the
war, its results, all possible different arguments and interpretations related to it, and from both
Muslim and Latin viewpoints. Beginning from the late twentieth century, the extensive increase
in the studies of the crusades has led historians who aimed heavily to focus on the Western
perspectives of the Crusades to start considering the Muslims’ side.
In 1987, Riley-Smith published the first edition of The Crusade, A History. In this
publication, Riley-Smith explains the political trends of the impact of the First Crusade’s success
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and the Second Crusade’s failure on both European Christians and on Muslims. Riley-Smith
noted the weak and divided Muslims’ response to the First Crusade. Toward which, he
emphasized that the success of the First Crusade depended on Muslims’ political division. He
also noted that the failure of the Second Crusade led to the growing power of Nur-ad-Din of
Aleppo. In addition, the failure placed Muslims morals in the highest level and showed how
dangerous a united Muslim Syria could be. Riley-Smith noticed that both crusaders and
Muslims justified the use of force toward what they both considered a just war of liberation. 27
With a consequentlist approach, Riley-Smith’s study draws evidences from both Muslims and
western perspectives to illuminate one another, and then places his own criticism on the image.28
The growing intellectual appetite for work on the crusades encouraged scholars to focus
more on Muslims’ response to the crusades. In 1999, Carole Hillenbrand published a textbook
concerned only with the Islamic perspectives on the Crusades. Hillenbrand’s study examined the
impact of the First and Second Crusades on Muslims. Rather than concerning with Muslims’
justifications of the war, Hillenbrand’s study provides an analysis to the causations and
consequences of the counter-crusading movements. Hillenbrand noticed the absence of
Muslims’ political leadership at the eve of the First Crusades. Even after the impact of the First
27
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Crusade, Hillenbrand proposed that all Muslim’s Jihad attempts seemed ill-assorted since freeing
Jerusalem had no significance to such rulers in this period.29 Hillenbrand’s study of the Second
Crusade proposes that, because of the Frankish siege of Damascus, the mood of Muslims within
Damascus and thereafter elsewhere in Syria seems to have been changed, but without any further
explanation to the incentives of that change. Furthermore, Hillenbrand’s argument implies that
the act of freeing Jerusalem represented the true Islamic Jihad at the age of the crusade. This
implication, however, assumed that the whole struggle between the act of crusading and that of
Jihad revolved around Jerusalem. In return, it fell short to explain such a plastic concept like the
concept of Jihad, which can be deployed in many different ways, perspectives and for varying
ends.30
From a Theological approach, the ideal theory of Islamic law succeeded to impose itself
on Muslims’ practices of Jihad, which in return influenced Muslims response to the crusades in
general, and to Second Crusade in particular. Toward this trend, in 2001, Roy Mottahedeh and
Ridwan al-Sayyid provided another Islamic specialist study with a consequentlist approach, since
it aimed at understanding the causations and consequences of the theoretical field of Muslims’
jus in bellum. The study concerns with the ideology of the holy war in the Islamic world before
and during the impact of the Crusades. Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid’s argument traces the
different interpretations of Jihad in Islamic history, and the ways by which Muslim intellectuals
treated the concept of Jihad. This study in particular offered an insight to the political influence
on Islamic Intellectuals’ interpretations of the term Jihad and its significances. On the other
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hand, the prime argument of the study proposes that the concept of Jihad as a holy and just war
never seemed to be embraced entirely in practical terms during the Crusades. 31 Mottahedeh and
al-Sayyid noted that although the religious theories of Jihad existed before and after the impact
of the Crusades, Muslims’ practical response came too short and far away from the holy war
theories, which would have offered the psychological fuel for Muslims toward a wide counterCrusading movement.
By applying a sociological approach to Mottahedeh’s and al-Sayyid’s study, the study
reveals an important aspect to the lack of Muslims’ response to the Crusades. Apparently, the
lack of Muslims’ response to the impact of the Crusades was the outcome of the separated
spheres of Muslims’ social structure. The ideology of the holy war, as mentioned before,
combines the theological theory of salvation with the practical action of the sword, by which it
provides the image of justice on the war and establishes the psychological needed good relation
with the superpower (God). This combination obliged a social integration amongst the religious
class who provides the theories and the people who provides the practices: the political
authorities, namely, the state and the general population. Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid’s argument
revealed that Muslim juries contributed and continued to contribute intellectual theories
regardless of the material conditions of the Islamic world. This meant that the theatrical field of
Jihad witnessed no significant changes after the impact of the crusades. What this leaves us with
is the practical field of the holy war, and certainly enough, the relationship between the human
institution of the state and its subjects.
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After all, it seems that all the various aspects of crusading and counter-crusading, its
religious theories, traditions, philosophies, literature and laws, has been roughly investigated
toward a better understanding of its manifold manifestations. There is, however one field that no
substantial advances can yet be registered, and which remains greatly a terra incognita: a
socioeconomic approach toward the ‘Holy War.’ Certainly, there is no direct connection
between the two topics. Moreover, this approach contradicts the oral tradition of events in the
Islamic world for all chroniclers considered only the religious perspective of the movements. In
addition, there is relatively little consistency about what constituted the counter-crusading
movements in the assortment of sources. Therefore, pursuing the traditional line of arguments
will surely indicate that religious values were always paramount. However, the socioeconomic
approach will reveal any transformation in the relationship between the state and its subjects.
Above all, one major responsibility for the Islamic state was to consider both moral and material
needs of its own subjects. Consequently, the aim and the major theme of the present work are to
shed the light on the transformations and the developments of the relationship between the
Islamic state and its Muslim subjects, which determined the magnitude and the extent of
Muslims’ practical warfare (Jihad).
This is not to underestimate the pull of ideology. The motives of Muslims’ response to
the crusaders have long intrigued historians, and, self evidently, faith lies at the heart of holy
war. From a modern-day western perspective, extreme religious fervor is often synonymous
with fanaticism, but in the Middle East, it was regarded as virtuous and positive at the age of
crusading, because it provided a notion of godly legitimate domination and authority. It was a
society saturated with religious beliefs in which faith provided the template and the boundaries
for almost every aspect of behavior, and where recognition of divine will and fear of the afterlife
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were universal. The fight against the enemies of God offered everyone in general and lay-people
in particular, a way to evade the torment of hell and this is the one reason why countercrusading movements became a fundamental feature of medieval Islam and perhaps until
today. 32
For the Muslim East, and to an extent, the Second Crusade provided no such harm if
compared to the First Crusade. Ironically, it struck a powerful chord with the forces of Islam.
Muslims’ Jihad in itself was not a new thought, but the scale of the movement after the Second
Crusade gave it unprecedented impetus. Consequently, the psychological and sociological
scopes of this study reflects a modern academic consensus on the duration and the extent of
Muslims’ Jihad movements from the Omayyad period, the First Crusade, the decades after the
conquest of Jerusalem in 1099, and until the death of Nur-ad-Din. Nur-ad-Din’s success
depended on a new sense of pan-Islamism: an uneasy truth between the Islamic state and its
subjects that drove wider numbers of Muslims to join forces against the crusaders. This new
sense revived into the Muslim world in response to the Second Crusade. In return, the extent of
Muslims practical warfare against the crusades became extremely wide.
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CHAPTER 2
THE MYTH OF ‘HOLY ISLAMIC EMPIRE’ AND THE FIRST CRUSADE
The Jihad seems to be the very epitome of the phrase ‘war of religion’ in Islam. A duty
provides Muslims with the fulfillment of their religious obligation. The ideas of earning
martyrdom and paradise strongly fed the motivation for Jihad. Especially at the occasion of
wars fought against unbelievers, the Holy Koran and the prophet’s hadiths extolled the merits of
fighting a Jihad and described the rewards waiting in the afterworld for those killed during holy
fighting. 33 This strong psychological motive offered Muslims with the new reconciliation
between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. Toward this ideology, Muslim juries
elaborated multiple logical theories of religious ideals aimed at providing a forceful motivation
to all Muslims to be parts of a war. The main philosophy of these theories aimed at altering the
war from a secular and political war into a combination of holy and just war. The main goal for
such an amalgamation revolved around fulfilling the psychological need of the general
population: the main force of all historical Islamic wars. Certainly, the motives that propelled
Muslims toward embracing Jihad in practical terms were multifarious.
In the end, although war is a political means, the diversity of war goals determined
distinctions in the motivations for each individual to be a part of a war. Therefore, the abundant
of motives led to the constancy of war brutality. This step influenced Muslim legists to question
the moral applications in such wars. Muslim legists attempted to set a tradition of mutually
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agreed procedures of combat, which included arrays of shared values among Muslims. These
values indicate the implicit (or the explicit) social agreement upon limits to their warfare. The
procedures outlined in most studies established a notion of war as a means of perusing goals
considered legitimate. The nature of these procedures made it clear that war is not the first or
primary goal. Legists prescribed fighting only when other means failed. This indicates that
resort to war must follow an attempt to pursue legitimate goals by nonlethal means.
Consequently, the tradition of legists’ Sharia reasoning provided an equivalent theory to the just
war criteria: legitimate authority, just cause, and righteous intentions. 34 It is clear that this
approach questioned the morality of the war in connection with broader issues of political ethics.
Therefore, in the light of the just war theory, this chapter will attempt understanding the diverse
interests, motives, and objects of Muslims’ perception of the First Crusade, which put them at
odds with one another.
In the just war thinking, the criterion of the legitimate authority serves a formal purpose
in thinking about the use of lethal force. Therefore, the Imam, which then meant much the same
thing as the Caliph, the supreme ruler and head over the entire Muslim community and polity,
had the ultimate responsibility for military operation. It was his duty to call for Jihad, weighing
its costs and benefits for the Muslims in any given circumstances, issues the summons and the
declarations, which signals the presence of war. 35 At the eve of the crusades, political
distinctions concerning the legitimacy of the authority influenced Muslim legists’ interpretation
to the concept of Jihad. Although juries’ interpretations drew on the same sources, their theories
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did not take shape in a vacuum but rather in the social and political atmospheres in which each
interpretation grew and developed. Thus, the divisions among Muslim’s juries concerning the
term of Jihad appeared by its nature to be more of a social expression to the issues of legitimacy,
justice, and necessity of such a war.
For example, the two major Islamic legal schools of Jihad’s interpretation existed in the
Islamic world at the eve of the First Crusade, the Maliki school of Hejaz36 and the Syrian School
of al-Shafi. 37 The Maliki School believed only in the defensive obligations of wars, and
condemned every kind of aggressive war. Literally, Malik was a political opposition to the
Omayyad; hence, he enforced a theoretical approach that doubted the way by which the Syrian
Omayyad Caliphs usurped power.38 In return, Malik raised the issue of the illegitimate authority
of the Syrian Omayyad Caliphs. Consequently, Malik denied the legitimacy of a Muslim
offering his service in any border warfare led by the Omayyad’s Caliphs. 39 There is no doubt
that this approach manipulated a wide audience among Muslims’ general population, who tended
to suspect the righteous intentions of their spiritual and political leadership. In return, Malik’s
audience viewed the deficiently of any wars that were led by the Omayyad Caliphs.
Meanwhile, Syrian jurists reflected the determination to make progress on the Byzantine
frontier in the first half of the second Islamic century. Accordingly, the offensive approach of
Jihad attracted Syrian jurists to support the legitimate authority of the Omayyad’s wars against
36
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Byzantium. Al-Shafi’s ideology presented the peak of the Syrian school’s interpretation of
Jihad’s doctrine. Al-Shafi’s version elevated the destruction of the atheism 40 to be the primary
justification of Jihad.41 Similar to al-Maliki, there is no doubt that this approach manipulated a
wide audience among Muslims’ general population, who tended to consider the righteous
intentions of their spiritual and political leadership and in response the war itself.
Although theoretically divided, Muslims went to war almost every year during the
Omayyad period, and for most of the period, the extent of Muslim citizens’ involvement in war
was extremely wide.42 At which time, the proportionality of Muslims’ regular warfare grew out.
The social ethos and above all the glory and good repute supported the Islamic expansions. It
seems that the Omayyad wars brought the different interests and motives of fairly all Muslims to
a form of an agreement. Indeed, the Omayyad’s expansions provided the Islamic world with
reasonable defensive measures. On the other hand, although offensive form of wars caused a
theoretical disagreement among Muslims, the Omayyad wars reflected the sense of a dominating
religion and its community. That motivated the major body of Muslim general population to
fight. The last point reveals, more decisively, the low-upper limit of shared motivation in the
Islamic expansions. Thus, the emphasis on a system of social analysis with considerable
psychological elements might bridge the gap between the war goals, social economics, and
Muslims’ enthusiasm toward the war.
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During the Omayyids, the military power locked economic growth to the Islamic State.
The argument is dense, but it may be reasonably summarized in this way. The Omayyad wars
brought to the Muslim world extensive territorial expansion, in addition to accumulation of
booty, both essential processes for the growth of wealth in the Islamic empire. These expansions
brought into the Islamic empire for the first time large traces of lands overlooking the
Mediterranean with access to waterways trade, together with larger traces of inland territories
with unlimited access to overland routes of trade and communication. It increased the extent of
agricultural territory within the Islamic state. It boosted the Levy, the extent of serf-labors, selfsufficiently on the large estates, peace and war and, more importantly, the changing role of the
state with the development of the large territorial empires. More decisively, the large territorial
empire changed the definition of the term ‘Muslims’ from a label of a religious community to an
actual label of a political and imperial unity. This meant that the identity-term ‘Muslims’
became the badge of the empire and its dominating community. In addition, psychologically, the
military expansions were useful for all Muslims, since it represented a way of resolving the
dissonance of a society at the expense of a foreign state. This is not an exhaustive list, but it will
suffice for later purposes in co-relating of bringing Jihad’s theory and practices together to
functionality. 43
The growing extension of unlimited resources brought about a case of social welfare into
the Islamic world, although ‘welfare’ is not an eighth-century concept. For the army, the pay
was mainly if not entirely to Muslim citizens. A long season of expansion probably meant active
campaigning, and this gave greater hopes of booty.44 The domination over trade routes created
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an extensive mine for employment in commercial businesses. The state assigned farmlands to its
own subjects, especially from the poorer strata. Christian and Jew inhabitants had to pay tributes
(jizia). This unlimited income financed more campaigns and brought into the empire more
resources. The Islamic state enjoyed strong and expanding urban networks, growing consumer
demands, increasing range of manufacturing activities, and highly commercialized economy. By
this system, the state’s administrators although motivated by gaining wealth, they created much
wealth, which they shared with their subjects. More precisely, the institutions of the state
manipulated the use of force for rational goals that benefited a whole community. Therefore,
rational production triggered the aims of power politics within the Islamic state. 45 This is not to
deny the religious perspective of the expansions.
Certainly, economic motivation can also be a catalyst to religious motivation. Based
upon the Weberian theory, members of different social classes adapt different belief systems to
explain their social situation. If true, then the growth of wealth in the Islamic world replaced the
wide-gap among Muslims by a majority of middle-class citizens. This step indicates that
Muslims, unequally, shared the economic privileges of a paramount citizenship, which the
Islamic imperial expansions provided. In retrospect, Muslims, unequally, supported the imperial
wars and coated it with Jihad theories. Weber proposed also that people understand themselves
to be able to be in a right relationship with supernatural powers, by which prosperity echoes a
blessing of God. By applying this approach to the Islamic society, it suggests that Muslims,
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regardless of their social class, viewed the act of war – which brought wealth for everyone within
the Islamic empire – as an act that created a good relationship with God. This, in return, granted
the psychological needed salvation. Furthermore, this development provided the senses of the
legitimate causation and righteous intentions on the act of fighting. Consequently, Muslim
general population viewed the Caliph who brought the entire God blessing wealth to his own
community as the legitimate authority.46 Above all, Muslim chroniclers attributed the
expansions of the Islamic empire to the creation, establishment, and spread of a new religion. 47
This is not to engage in the debate of whether (or not) Muslims converted the submitted states
into Islam. Better yet, this point indicates that the imperial conquests became a holy mission,
and in return, the empire itself became a holy state.
In outcome, the economic growth – viewed as superpower’s blessings – created a set of
mutually agreed rules of combat among Muslims, because it reflected a sense of a common
identity in the Islamic society, more precise, solidarity between the state administration and its
subjects. This sense combined the underlying secular and economic factors of the war with the
inherent fulfillment of the religious obligations by which it turned the secular war into mass
movements of holy and just war. In return, it met the general population’s psychological need in
the form of reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. Moreover,
Muslim subjects viewed the empire’s authority in the form of the caliph and his administration
that created the so-called godly blessing wealth as a legitimate authority. The issue of righteous
intentions, therefore, coated the act of war. Hence, the relationship between the state and its
citizens brought Jihad’s practices (the practical warfare) into action, because the empire
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succeeded to provide the necessary means for the large-scale warfare. Only under this term, the
practical magnitude of Jihad turned into a totally mainstream activity, accepted and endorsed by
an entire society. Given the fact that Muslims considered the empire a holy and sovereign state,
the practical warfare met the religious motivation.
This is not to imply that Muslim participants dedicated themselves to Jihad for the reason
that it brought them back the imperial wealth. That is over-simplicity. The point is that Muslims
participants devoted themselves to Jihad with the thrust of their worldviews; and their Islamic
identity bestowed the major force of their worldviews. To appreciate the significance of this
fact, over time the definition ‘Muslims’ relatively described the mighty dominating community
of the holy Islamic empire. Gradually, the golden age of the Islamic empire became the actual
definition of the term ‘Muslims.’ Surely, Muslim chroniclers had no interest to define
themselves with failures. In addition, this definition glossed as the thin layer of gregarious selfsatisfaction, which combined both the religious and worldly powers together, namely the Godgiven authority to dominate and civilize the world. Therefore, Muslims viewed other nations’
submission to the Islamic empire as equal as submission to God himself. 48 This is not to admit
that Muslims followed a theory of ‘special election.’ Although it is hard to dispute this line of
argument, it would be more reasonable to state that the ascending imperial triumph created an
ongoing belief among Muslims in the God-given ‘right of domination.’
Nonetheless, from the stabilization of Muslim’s frontiers with the outside world and the
cessation of Islamic conquests in the ninth century, Muslim’s major cities enjoyed a case of
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mutual peace and tolerance with the world outside their borders. 49 This step, however, ended the
increase in landed wealth within the Islamic Empire. For centuries, landed wealth represented
the main wealth and revenue in the Islamic empire, and new wealth came majorly from wars and
politics not from enterprise. In the absence of economic innovations, the cessation of the
conquests turned the Islamic empire into a standstill form of pax Islamica. Deprived from
gaining access to more natural resources, the growing population began to outstrip the available
resources.50 In this process, the greatest military success, which locked economic growth to the
Islamic state, destroyed the model military state. The widespread use of servants in the military
severely restricted the scope for free indigenous Muslims, blocked their fair-share in previous
booty organization and denied their influence over foreign policy. 51
The shift among Muslims from reliance on Muslim subjects within to reliance on chattel
servants from outside indicates that a wholly new social class of military elites emerged in the
Islamic world. The Atabegs class52 became a cultural and linguistic distinctive feature in the
Islamic societies. In a short period, the new military elites obtained political power over the
state, which they used to acquire wealth rather than creating it. In essence, Muslims’ foreign
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wars and expansion gradually ceased to be the occupation of Muslim general population. 53 This
step, in retrospect, brought about the end to the positive relationship between the Islamic state
and its subjects. Notably, that change had no significant impact on the intellectual works for
Muslim juries continued to provide logical theories of Jihad. However, if what follows has a
static appearance on the practical field, it is because the relationship between Muslim leaders and
their subjects witnessed a sharp negative turn.
For the leaders’ class, political distinctions concerning the legitimacy of the authority –
together with the lack of right intent – influenced their practical response to the crusaders.
Between 1092- 1094, the Islamic world suffered a clean sweep of all major political leaders from
Egypt eastwards. The murder of the greatest figure of the Seljuk Empire, the vizier Nizam alMulk, and then the death of the Seljuk’s Sultan Malikshah, devastated the Seljuk’s Sultanate. In
Egypt, the death of the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir followed by the death of his vizier Badr alJamali brought about the end to the Fatimid’s dynasty. The same year, 1094, witnessed the death
of the Abbasside Sunni caliph, al-Muqtadi.54 In the absence of rightful leadership, the military
and bureaucratic elites shifted the role of the Islamic state into a state governed by status and
civic ideologies. This policy disintegrated the Islamic empire into principalities over which
wealth motivated members of ruling families to fight each other.
Ibn al-Athir perceived the state of affairs of the Islamic world in the statement:
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When the Franks – may God frustrate them – extended their control over what
they had conquered of the lands of Islam and it turned out well for them that the
troops and the kings of Islam were preoccupied with fighting each other, at that
time opinions were divided among the Muslims, desires differed and wealth was
squandered.55
Ibn al-Athir’s statement denoted the impact of the shocking defeat on a Muslim. It seems that he
attempted to absorb the humiliating defeat. Hence, he claimed that Muslims no longer treated
their land as a holy domain, but rather as merely wealth. Although this point indicates the
gradual shift in Muslims’ ideology of the role of the state, it illuminated Ibn al-Athir’s divided
attitude between the glorious past and the shocking present. For centuries, the House of Islam
(the Islamic empire) meant something more to Muslims than a modern nation-state. It did not
mean merely land or wealth. The Islamic state was a rational-driven holy and sovereign state. It
made law within and outside its borders; it made war or peace as it saw fit.56 The defeat,
however, demythologized Muslims symbol divinely state. In addition, he portrayed the image of
the Islamic state to the elites’ class. According to Ibn al-Athir, the Islamic state meant wealth to
the Atabegs. This ideology faded the existence of the righteous intentions away from wars led
by the existed leadership.

The general thrust of a just war is that a nation waging war should be doing it for the
cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest. On that account, Muslim subjects may
counter that national interest is paramount. Therefore, the issue of intention raises the concern of
practicalities for the reason that it induces wider number of citizens to support the war.
Consequentially, a leader’s reaction to an expected aggression profoundly demonstrates the
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possession of good intent. To the Fatimid, the appearance of the First Crusade was not a
surprise. The Aleppan chronicler, al-Azimi, mentioned that the Byzantine Emperor had
informed the Fatimid authorities early about the appearance of the Franks. The Fatimid,
however, determined to use crusaders’ army for their interest. In reality, the Crusaders inflicted
damage into the Seljuk Empire, the political and sectarian rivals of the Fatimid. Therefore, it
was not a coincidence that the Fatimid possessed Jerusalem, while the Seljuk’s army battled the
First Crusade in Anatolia. 57
On the other hand, the cessation of the Abbasside conquests substituted the strong
Caliphate by an idle state. To the Sunni world, the first focus for any call to Jihad falls on the
Abbasside Caliph in Baghdad. In just war thinking, the criterion of the legitimate authority
serves a formal purpose to think about the use of lethal force. Thus, the Caliph – who was the
supreme ruler and head over the entire Sunni-Muslim community – had the ultimate
responsibility for military operations. It was his duty to call for Jihad, weighing its costs and
benefits for the Muslims in any given circumstances, issues the summons and the declaration,
which signals the presence of war. 58 In theory, the Abbasside Caliph al-Mustazhir had the
legitimate authority to wage and promote such a holy war against the Franks. 59
Nonetheless, al-Mustazhir had lost much of his territories to the Turkic military elites.
This process hindered the major source of income to the state. In return, al-Mustazhir lost the
economic stimulus to wage wars against the crusades. Despite the envoys sent to Baghdad
requesting the Caliph's support, the Caliph ignored all requests. Ibn al-Jawazi recorded somberly
57

Al-Azimi, "La chronique abrègèe d'Al-Azimi," Journal Asiatique 230 (1938): 371.
M. Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History, 12-13; R. Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern
Islam, 1-7; Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, 104, 154-157.
59
See A. Noth, "Heiliger Kampf (Jihad) gegen die "Franken": Zur Position der
Kreuzzüge im Rahmen der Islam-geschichte," Saeculum 37 (1986): 243.
58

37

the story of al-Harawi, a judge from Damascus, requesting the Caliph to send his troops to aid
the Syrians. Nonetheless, it seems that al-Mustazhir disregarded the concern. 60 Although there
is no evidence, it is my impression that the Caliph promoted his personal gain, since the crusader
army inflected damage to all the forces of his political rivalries including: the Turkic Atabegs,
the Seljuk Empire, and the Fatimid Caliphate. I repeat this is merely an impression until
properly researched.
To this concern, Hitti stated that, the crusaders were “a strange and unexpected enemy.” 61
Perhaps it is true to refer to the crusaders as a strange enemy, but definitely, they were an
expected one. News of the crusaders approaching the Islamic world had circulated among
political leaders, who in return determined to use the forthcoming army for their personal
interests. Hence, Muslim leaders’ reaction to the expected crusader army eliminated the
presence of the right intent in their wars. Thus, after the Crusader States slotted into the political
map of the Islamic world, the Turkic Atabegs, Fatimid, Seljuk, and perhaps even the Abbasids
were willing to use them. 62 For example, Ridawan, the governor of Aleppo maintained political
alliance with Tancred of Antioch against the ruler of Mosul. 63 Similar arrangements took place
between the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Fatimid Caliphate through Shams alKhalifa, the governor of Ascalon who was mainly motivated by keeping the trade undisturbed. 64
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According to Ibn al-Adim, the political elites of Aleppo were in favor of the Franks’ existence
because they helped perpetuate the independent status of their city. 65
The issue of right intent demonstrates the level of moral values that justifies the war. In
return, the presence of moral values provides the religious perspective to the act of violence.
This is not to underestimate the matter of necessity. That is to imply that in the presence of
controversial intellectual works that justified the act of war, the concerns of necessity could
possibly elevate any practical warfare to the level of Jihad. Hence, it is surely hard to determine
what Muslim actions may (or may not) be called a Jihad. This step, however, depends on the
extent of Muslims’ support to the movement because it points to the level of shared motivations
in a common society. By applying the former analysis on Zengi’s movement, though his
movement presented a necessity due to the pressure of the crusaders, it lacked the public support.
Sivan argued that the serious mobilization of Jihad as an instrument in the war against
the crusaders began in the time of Zengi and reached its peak when Zengi sacked Edessa in
1144.66 In practice, although Zengi’s response represented the first serious Islamic practical
warfare against the crusaders, Zengi’s attack on Edessa offered another example of an
opportunistic movement. Definitely, Zengi’s attempts lacked the Syrian publics’ support, which
was vital to the practical and moral magnitudes of his movement. To appreciate the significance
of this fact, the religious class offered no support to Zengi, which was important to color his
activities with Islamic zeal. Ibn al-Qalanisi stated on Zengi’s attempt to acquire Damascus, “The
amir Imad al-Din Atabek had long been desirous of it, ambitious to possess himself of it, and on
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the watch to seize any opportunity against it.”67 This statement, in keeping with Zengi’s record,
indicates a man following personal ambitions. Before taking Edessa, Zengi aimed at obtaining
Damascus itself. Although he gained control of Homs and Baalbek, he failed to take Damascus.
Zengi stood as a grave threat in Syria to both Muslims and Crusaders, not only because of his
military skills, but also and majorly because of his exceptional brutality and cruel behaviors. 68
Ibn al-Qalanisi, who was an inhabitant of Damascus, described Zengi’s failure at Damascus,
“There was a wholesale slaughter. Survivors were killed or imprisoned. Those who could,
whether or not they were wounded, escaped the city. That day, but for God’s grace, the city
would have fallen.”69
Certainly, Zengi threatened the Damascenes more than the Franks. Ibn al-Qalanisi's
thankful feelings towards Zengi’s disappointment at the walls of Damascus explain a
Damascene’s relieve. This proves that the publics of Syria perceived Zengi’s movements as a
man who aimed at conquering them. In return, his wars lacked their support. In addition,
regarding Zengi’s threat to Damascus, the Damascenes signed a pact with the Franks to drive
Zengi away. 70 Apparently, the Damascenes chose the safer path – though not proper – to shake
hands with the crusaders than giving up to Zengi. There is no evidence that the Damascenes
opposed their ruler when he decided to make an alliance with the Franks. It seems that Muslim
subjects had no enthusiasm toward Zengi’s movements. Whether (or not) Zengi provided a
leadership of Jihad, scholars are free to express their moral judgment. It is important to stress,
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however, that some Muslims viewed Zengi in this light; and it is surely plausible to argue that his
victory at Edessa raised Muslim hopes in the struggle with the Franks. 71 Nonetheless, Zengi’s
ruthlessness disturbed his relationship with Muslim subjects. In return, Zengi’s movements
remained petite.
Behind this opportunistic Islamic leadership, the major force of the Islamic world in the
form of Muslim subjects maintained a low-voice of pan-Islamism. There is no doubt that the
loss of the Jerusalem provoked religious fervor among the general population. 72 Although in
reality, Muslim peasants might have viewed the idea of fighting for any of the warlords, who
technically allied with the Franks against fellow Muslims, a deficient and an unjust war. This is
not to imply that Muslim leaders’ movements lacked the support of religious theories, eventually
each warlord propagandized his personal campaigns against crusaders as a Jihad.73 However,
there is no evidence that Muslim subjects become members of any major military campaigns
against the crusaders except for the defense of their own cities. 74 The dilemma occurs in
peasants’ conceptualizations of the holy war.
For centuries, Muslim called the Islamic empire, Umma. This concept meant
‘community’ and reflected the very identity of Muslims. In return, Muslims became members of
wars to defend (or to expand the dominating power of) their identity. That is to consider all the
moral and material rewards of these wars. Therefore, Muslim mythologized the idea of the
Islamic state. In the end, Muslims fought for the Islamic state and not for a specific monarch.
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Therefore, the Islamic state as a shared identity provided the moral justice for the Jihad. After
the impact of the First Crusade, the choice to fight meant fighting for a specific leader rather than
for the state itself. Therefore, the ideology of self-defense provided the moral justice in
reference to the dogma of Jihad. This new ideology replaced the principle of fighting for the
Islamic state. This is plausible in keeping with the social and economical transformation to the
role of the Islamic state.
Above all, the invasion of the First Crusade demythologized Muslims high expectations
regarding the mighty Islamic state. After centuries of literary works of mythologizing the
invincible Islamic empire, the crushing defeat was a reality. In the eyes of its inhabitants, not
only Muslim soldiers, but also God himself defended the Islamic empire. Not for nothing
Muslims called their dominion, ‘House of Islam’ for within its territories exists the ‘true
believers’75 of god and the innumerable holy buildings. They ranged from Mecca to Jerusalem
and from the ages of Moses and Jacob to Jesus, Mohamed, and the Great Caliphs. Nonetheless,
the devastating defeat was a reality. In return, Muslims’ morals plummeted; and so too their
enthusiasm to Jihad. On the other hand, the crusaders have never been more than a dominant
minority of distinctive cultures in the Islamic world like the atabegs. These transformations
deprived Muslim subjects of a way of serving the state.
In a case of limited natural resources, the economical and political rise of the Turkic
military class led to the political decline of the general population’s influence on the state. 76 This
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decline reduced the subjects’ survival needs down to only the need to live and to subsist. Even
in survival situations like the impact of the First Crusade, Muslim subjects needed to still care
about few little things to keep their subsisting needs together with as much as possible of dignity.
This psychological approach explains those who chose modus vivendi with the Crusaders. Thus,
to understand the impact the First Crusade on Muslim subjects and its consequences, the starting
point must surely be three facts. First, Muslim general population viewed the Islamic world as
one world, even after the city-states’ political division. In theory, the title city-state indicates the
administrative definition of a territory, though the city-state in the Islamic empire was a province
of the much larger Islamic state, whether the Abbasside or the Fatimid. Any territorial state
which has a number of conglomerations within its border must necessarily define and distinguish
among those conglomerations for the purposes of security, taxation, and all the other demands
and services that social life entails.
Although after the fragmentation, the Islamic empire, which for centuries defined the
term ‘Muslims,’ became just a theory: memory preservations of what once was a great empire,
and in retrospect, memory preservation of what once characterized Muslims’ identity. Ironically,
all Muslim chroniclers of the crusades defined themselves and their communities as ‘Muslims’
regardless of their cultural diversities and political disintegrations. This definition brought back
the memories of centuries of a political unity by which the Islamic empire became an identity
and its community defined itself with the term ‘Muslims.’ Nonetheless, chroniclers continued to
use the same term to define themselves. It seems plausible to state that Muslim chroniclers
looked back to the glorious past of the Islamic empire to escape the straightjackets of present
failures. Therefore, Muslim chroniclers tended to view themselves as members of the great and
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successful empire.77 Second, urbanization characterized the Islamic world more than any other
society at this time. Third, the foundation of each social class – which has attained a certain
degree of development and has been brought about by the exchange of commodities – is the
separation of town from country. This is not an exhaustive list, but it will explain the reasons
that deprived Muslim subjects away from wars and politics after the impact of the First Crusade.
Although neither geographers nor historians nor sociologists agreed on a standard
definition for the term ‘city,’ in socioeconomic terms, cities arose because of the incapacity of
the two forms of human associations, the household and the larger kinship grouping, to satisfy all
legitimate needs of their members. Self-sufficiency was, therefore, the objective, and a properly
structured city should be able to achieve that goal, save for the unavoidable lack of essential
natural resources, for which foreign trade was admissible. The Islamic cities mainly were
trading centers, where luxurious goods of the Far East found their way to the West. Before the
foundation of the Crusader States, the rise of the Atabegs led to a spoils system. This
development adversely affected the activities of the merchants, who suffered from the demands
of the ruler and his military followers. In return, the increasing interest of the state changed the
social status of Muslim subjects in the urban areas into servants to the Atabegs’ interest.78 In
Muslims’ trading cycle, coastal towns represented the outlet to the Mediterranean. For centuries,
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the Islamic state provided high measures of protection and innovations that facilitated the trading
cycles. Once the coastal towns fell to the crusaders, it was necessary for Muslim traders to find a
way to keep the sufficiency of their trading business without any support from the Islamic state.
Consequently, Muslim traders and sea captains enjoyed a safe-conduct from a king of Jerusalem,
and by the thirteenth-century, there was an important Syrian trading community in Tyre. 79
For security purposes of city autonomy, cities granted higher levels of safety to the
inhabitants due to the adequate fortifications. Thus, the majority of Muslim general population
inhibited major cities like Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad. For the Islamic major cities, the
impact of the First Crusade did not exceed the limits of stories, which the survivors mentioned.
Although Muslim subjects could have encountered delegations from Syria visiting Baghdad to
request the Caliph’s military assistance, it seems that subjects in Muslim major cities adapted a
form of politics isolationism. The long-term isolation of Muslim general population from being
involved in foreign affairs and wars dominated the momentum. Hence, the general population
viewed the problem of the crusader presence in Syria as a matter of high politics. In return,
Muslim subjects left the matter to Muslim politicians, leaders, and military. 80
For the rural areas, the Islamic state distributed portions of the conquered lands amongst
Muslim subjects in the form of semi-ownership in return for a regular payment during the age of
Islamic expansions. Notably, Muslim citizens who took these lands were soldiers in the Islamic
army, thus indigenous Christians or Jews remained working and living on the land in return for a
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rental or payment to the landlords. Therefore, the majority of inhabitants in the Islamic country
continued to be indigenous Christians and Jews. After the end of the expansion, the state failed
to make payments to the new military class. Consequently, the state granted military officers the
fiscal rights to collect the land revenues for their salaries. In practice, the grantee exercised
economic and social de facto control. This process contributed to the depopulation of the rural
parts of the Islamic Empire. Muslim subjects left the rural parts and resided in urban areas in
search for other business.81
Therefore, very few Arabs were productive settlers of the land after the foundation of the
Crusader States, especially in Palestine and Syria. A few were landlords who used native tenants
to cultivate their estates. Generally, they were nomadic tribesmen, soldiers, and officials, all of
whom lived off the poll tax.82 Although as well as the vicissitude, crusaders onslaught followed
by a wave of Muslim internal migration. In 1100, Ibn Muyasser stated, “Many people from the
Syrian territories came to Egypt fleeing from the Franks and famine.”83 There is also some
evidence for refugee movements in Syria and Palestine. 84 Nonetheless, almost all Muslim
chroniclers who recorded the native displacement activities portrayed references neither to the
status nor to the nature of the refugees. 85
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Although religion provides an important psychological force, especially in the case of
Jerusalem, it was not the sole driving force for counter-crusading movements. It seems that the
gradual shift in the role of the Islamic state influenced Muslim subjects’ understanding of
politics. A political virtue gives men a sense of justice, and sufficient consideration for rights of
the self and the others to make the civilized community. 86 This virtue makes civil peace possible
because peasants would at least be able to insure their survival and subsistence needs. In return,
this persuaded Muslim subjects to set a comparison between the truthful and the false man. For
Muslim subjects, the idea of Jihad mirrored their perception to justice. This quest rejoins the
interpretation that this step reflects peasants’ attempt of modus vivendi with Crusaders. E. P.
Thompson linked the notion of a new capitalist cultural mentality, which uses the economical
resources for its own ends against peasants and their need for subsistence insurance from the
mysterious future, especially in hard times; a concept which Thompson called ‘moral
economy’. 87
Thompson’s argument revealed a social psychological approach to a ruling class that
practices submissive policy against their subjects. This facet revealed a suppressed general
population who lived in a society that does not suit their purposes. The issue implicit in the
notion of how far the economy and power relations within a society influence the diverse moral
understandings of justice, without which a society suffers the loss of the shared identity. The
sense of shared identity, in retrospect, produces a strong and sufficient community against
foreign threats because it reveals similar understandings of justice. By comparison, the growing
sense of injustice between the authorities of the Islamic state and their subjects created an
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underlying social crisis. This negative assessment altered the subjects’ conceptualization of
Jihad in response to foreign threats from as high as pan-Islamism down to the self and family
members.
The religious class, however, promoted legal Jihad’s theories against the Franks. Few
isolated voices spoke out in concentration at the loss of Jerusalem. The legal judge 'qadi' Abu alFadl al-Kashshab of Aleppo represented an early model for the active participation of the
religious class in the Jihad against the Franks. Abu al-Fadl preached the teaching of Jihad
among the publics of Aleppo in an attempt to infuse Islamic fervor into the general population.
His preaching said Ibn al-Adim on what he heard from one of the soldiers who were listening to
the preaching of Abu al-Fadl, “we have come from our lands to follow a man in a turban.” 88
This statement presented the image of a man of religion, identified by his turban, and preaching
Jihad to the public. Although these sorts of attempts came to be very limited, only the religious
class had the ability to deal with Muslim’s social disorientation. The religious class represented
the key-link to unite the efforts of the general population together with the authorities into a
wide-scale Jihad against the Franks because they provide the religious coating on the act of
fighting. 89
A similar turbulence took place in the Caliph’s mosque of Baghdad. There, the religious
class laid shame on their leadership by pressing the public against them. It seems that this
movement did not amuse the de facto ruler of the Sunni Caliph, al-Mustazhir, as it challenged his
legal authority. 90 Another outstanding exception to the activities of the religious class was the
Syrian legist Ali Ibn Tahir al-Sulami. Al-Sulami preached publicly to the general population in
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the Omayyad mosque of Damascus in the early years after the fall of Jerusalem. Al-Sulami
urged his listeners – while preaching his Kitab al-Jihad – to take up arms against the Crusaders.
He exerted all Muslim peasants in the region to unite in opposition to the Latin Christian
invaders. In his preaching, he demonstrated the examples of the early Caliphs and their
prosecution of Jihad. Thus, he proposed that the weakness and negligence of later caliphs led to
the humiliating defeat of Muslims. 91
To this concern, al-Sulami attempted to introduce Islamic fervor to the unconcerned
Caliph. He aspired to use public opinion to urge the Caliph to practice Jihad. al-Sulami aimed
his message, as well, at the Atabeg. He portrayed them as appointees from God to watch over
and defend the land of Islam, rather than appointees from the Caliph.92 Most significant
regarding al-Sulami’s call for Jihad, he stated that the provincial rulers did not require the
Caliph’s authorization to wage defensive holy war (Jihad) against enemies.93 The importance of
this step reflects that the issue of necessity concerned al-Sulami’s approach more than the issue
of legitimacy. Although al-Sulami’s call proved that he realized that his sense of self was now
under assault from the crusaders,94 it showed the tendency to minimize the distance between the
glorious past and the current state of the Islamic world. 95
Al-Sulami’s identification with the historical discipline of the Islamic Rightly Guided
Caliphs that defined his texts discussed his relationship to the idea of pan-Islamism. 96 In
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addition, it demonstrated his connection to the history of the Islamic empire. All make clear that
the process of self-identification with the past of the Islamic empire was a continuing one, not
something fixed once and for all by the events. These memories constituted (if not a conscious
critique of the Islamic history) at least an implicit questioning of its limits, more precisely, the
limits of time and space. Al-Sulami placed the historical context of the Islamic empire into an
unfit situation. The Abbasside Caliph, who stood as the legitimate leader of the Sunni Muslims,
suffered a major weakness and the Turkic Atabegs promoted their personal interest. Muslim
subjects, on the other hand, had no way to practice Jihad and serve the state. Consequently, all
practical attempts of Jihad against the crusaders were ill affirmed, ill supported, and of no
significance.
Indeed, in the latter half of the tenth century, Ibn Hawaqal condemned the absence of the
Jihad.97 The Arab geographer Al-Muqaddasi supported this criticism. Speaking about the
province of Syria, al-Muqaddasi complained that, “the inhabitants have no enthusiasm for Jihad
and no energy in the struggle against the enemy.” 98 Though the concept of Jihad was, is, and
will always be an embedded pillar in the Islamic belief, this elastic concept carried different
percepts to each individual. Nonetheless, Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasi’s references to Jihad
aimed at the practical warfare against the crusaders. Responsibilities for the practical
performance of Jihad fell on the leaders and the subjects. Nonetheless, the socioeconomic and
sociopolitical crisis pre-existed in the Islamic world had devastated the Islamic state. Although
the idea of ‘mighty Islamic empire’ survived in the memories of Muslim citizens, Muslims
attempted to absorb the new reality of the shocking defeat. It was during this period that
Muslims chose different forms of ‘live and let live’ with the newcomers.
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Crusaders’ invasion of the Islamic land was in a high sense among Muslims a religious
war.99 Such a concept should have provoked Muslims – who saw their lands as holy chosen
domains – to wage a holy war against the invaders. Muslims, however, resented their variance
with one another. Though the First Crusade was not a surprise, its success shocked Muslims
who had the confidence that outbreaks of enemies of Islam would be at most temporary setbacks
in a longer story of Islamic victories. When the humiliating defeat occurred, Muslims searched
the depth of their memories to discover some vestige of the past, not the past of individual,
faltering and ephemeral, but rather that of the community, which, though defeated, nonetheless
represented that the defeat was a permanent instance in the lasting victories. This indicates that
Muslims underestimated the strength of the First Crusade. Even after the defeat, Muslims failed
to bridge the gap between the past and the present; and when they realized that the defeat was an
avoidable fact, each division followed a procedure to insure a simple survival instinct.
In addition to Muslims’ divided attitude between the past and the present, the invasion
revealed that the Muslims’ political disorientation brought about a socioeconomic crisis. It
seems plausible to state that Muslims’ deep confidence in the holy power of the Islamic state
convinced them that even at the time of bewilderment, god protected the Islamic land.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that not long before the First Crusade, this social crisis
prompted the Islamic legist, al-Ghazali, to develop a social economic hypothesis by which he
urged the state’s authorities to regulate the economic activities of individuals. Al-Ghazali
recognized the fact that, although salvation bestowed the ultimate goal of human actions, the
pursuit of a social welfare is a necessary part for achieving that goal because without it, the
social unrest would devastate individuals’ moralities. In return, it would devastate the example
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‘divinely state.’ Accordingly, he urged the state to ensure the proper functioning of the economy
and the fulfillment of what he called the divinely ordained social obligations. 100
Al-Ghazali’s approach brought about an analogous premise to the Weberian philosophy
that members of different social classes adopt different belief systems to express their social
situation. 101 This meant that the major body of Muslim general population shared different
religious beliefs than those of the political authorities. In return, this step indicates that
understandings of Jihad differed among Muslims. It is possible to characterize the developments
in the Islamic world as a privatization of power where individual Atabegs successfully defied the
residual power of the state. This implies that the Atabegs privatized the ideology of Jihad after
the privatization of the Islamic state, regardless of the issues of legitimacy, causation, intention,
and above all, the concerns of their subjects. As Henri Frankfort phrased it, “without oriental
precedent in one respect: the gods and the universe were described by him as a matter of private
interest.”102
It is worth stressing at the point that there is no Marxism there, no theory, merely the
direct result to the gradual cession of the power and domination of what once was a large human
institution, namely the great Islamic empire. This step coupled with a conflicted attitude about
Muslims self-identity. After the defeat, Muslims found themselves torn between the high
expectations of the past and the present crisis. Unable to affirm any of them, Muslims absorbed
the defeat as a fact and chose to live with the crusaders. It would be naive, however, to state that
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without the arrival to more settled social relations and the revival of economics, Muslims failed
to embrace Jihad. This rather implies that Muslim participants committed themselves to Jihad
with the impetus of a worldview, above all the practical role of the human institution responsible
for organizing Muslim efforts, the state.
In any case, it does not alter the important fact that the Islamic empire – which previously
dominated the Near East – existed. Surely, all chroniclers referred to themselves as Muslims,
regardless of their coherent diversity. Baghdad, though decayed, remained the center of politics,
diplomacy, administration, and the source of the identity of the Islamic empire. It is worth
stressing again that the Islamic empire in the seventh century, let alone the empire of the eighth
century, was by the standards of the pre-industrial world, a powerful, well-organized, and
wealthy state. Curiously enough, the Islamic empire – which played a large part in all Jihad
campaigns before the presence of the Crusades – was the only one where men had evolved a
constitution in which the individual was trained and disciplined to be subordinate. Driven out of
Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, the empire could no longer be a great power. It was now battling for
its very survival, and to do so it would have to adapt.
The impact of the First Crusade, however, revealed these realities. It revealed that the
Islamic empire existed, but it was not the same empire of the seventh century. Though it
survived two centuries of crisis, it was no longer the superpower of the Near East. The imperial
domination was now a myth. Notably, Muslims preserved this fable in their memories. It
revealed also that Muslims were indeed subjects, although not to a ‘Great Monarch’, but to the
State itself, which for centuries fulfilled their moral and material needs. In reality, the Islamic
empire was a completely different state when the First Crusade struck the Islamic world. The
presence of the Islamic empire preserved a number of fundamental institutions including the
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Caliph Court and Sunni orthodoxy. Nonetheless, the Atabegs privatized other important
institutions like the army and taxation. Both institutions were important key-factors to the
successful warfare of all historical Islamic victories. Therefore, Muslims lived in a community
established in the seventh-century that did not match the state of reality in the ninth-century.
This point stands to prove the lack of adaptability. It seems plausible to state that for the great
Islamic empire existed only in theory, the concept ‘Muslims’, which for century defined the
common identity of a whole community, was a theory as well. Unlike the age of expansion, the
definition ‘Muslims’ described a religious, politic, and economic unite. Now, the definition
‘Muslims’ became a vague concept that described the broad-spectrum religious identity of
distinctive communities.
The ideology of the holy war, though highly moral, it relies heavily on general
population’s awareness that they share something in common: a belief in a paramount national
cause to acknowledge loyalty to the state itself. This form of loyalty creates a sense of shared
identity that offers the turbulent peasants with legitimate causations to fight. In the practical
absence of the Islamic empire, Muslims lost the shared identity and the human institution that
manage their Jihad’s efforts. Therefore, the shocking defeat convinced Muslims that their
Jihad’s practices brought them back neither a better life nor the hopes of a better life nor the
aspiration of salvation. In return, the extent of Muslim citizens’ involvement in war against the
First Crusade was extremely short. Consequently, it is true to claim that although the sense of
Jihad existed in theories, 103 the practical absence of the Islamic state influenced the lack of the
practical Jihad.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TURNING POINT
The whole of the Near East was on the move. So indeed must have seemed to some
Muslim peasants, looking up bewildered from their patch of land, as a massive army surged past
like a river in spate. Fifty years after the First Crusade, Latin’s ambition and confidence in
God’s divine power influenced the call for the Second Crusade. The capture of Edessa in 1144
by Zengi of Mosul provoked the papacy to issue the charter of the Second Crusade. In 1145,
Pope Eugenius III addressed Quantum praedecessores to King Louis VII and the French
nobility. The Levant’s leg of the campaign aimed at recapturing the city of Edessa from
Zengi. 104 Despite the campaign’s vast magnitude, the Second Crusade proved to be a disaster to
Europeans. Rather than recapturing Edessa or taking Aleppo, the campaign broke at the gates of
Damascus.
The invasion of Damascus, which was about to take place, marked a new phase toward
the absence of Jihad in the Islamic world. Due to the Frankish siege of Damascus, Muslim’s
mood within Damascus and thereafter elsewhere in Syria seemed to have changed. Though
almost every small area and city-state was at variance with the other, what Muslims resented
after the Second Crusade was the desperate need for a strong leader to call himself the Godappointed ruler of all other men. Therefore, the impact of the Second Crusade united nearly all
Muslims in the struggle. The invasion forced all Muslims to follow a simple survival instinct.
Indeed, not since Muslim’s humiliating experience of the First Crusade and the loss of
Jerusalem, had the inhabitants of a major Muslim city felt the presence of the Franks within their
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walls. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the impact of the Second Crusade on Muslims’
social and moral disciplines, which led Muslims to embrace the practical Jihad.
Apart from detailing the campaign, the impact of the Second Crusade brought about the
political unity to the Islamic Empire. A notable example of the formalistic approach is the point
at which a voluntary association of independent Islamic states was converted into an Islamic
Empire. The impact of the Second Crusade triggered an alliance among the governors of
northern Syria: Saif-ad-Din, Nur-ad-Din, and Unur of Damascus. Ibn al-Athir, who wrote in
northern Syria in the early thirteenth-century, indicated that Unur – the Atabeg of Damascus –
appealed to Saif-ad-Din of Mosul, who joined Nur-ad-Din at Homs and was poised to march
south to help lift the siege off Damascus.105 The sense of Ibn al-Athir’s writing is that Unur had
appealed well before the siege began. At most, such an action was a symbol, a brutal statement
of the reality, but not the reality itself. The word ‘voluntary’ is not even a good symbol, leading
into remarkable verbal contortions. Before appealing to the Zengids, 106 Unur threatened the
crusaders to hand over Damascus to the Zengids if the crusaders did not retreat.107 This step
indicates that a survival instinct guided Unur’s decision. Meanwhile he attempted to maintain
the independent status of Damascus through negotiation with the crusaders, he prepared a
secondary plan of voluntary league with the Atabegs of Mosul and Homs.
In addition, the aftermath of the Second Crusade created the conditions for Nur-ad-Din to
take control of Damascus and the whole of northern Syria in the name of uniting Muslim’s
powers.108 The humiliating retreat of the campaign had evidently dealt an enormous blow to the
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cause of crusading in the West. Probably, the cumulative effect of fifty years of literary and
architectural recordings of the First Crusade had contributed to a widespread European belief
that God approved a new crusade and that it would be victorious. Hence, when the campaign
collapsed so dismally, European morals plummeted too. As Europeans absorbed the outcome of
the campaign, the papacy felt the consequences as well. Such feeling may have influenced the
pope’s caution over a new expedition. It seems certain that the failure of the Second Crusade
had an impact upon Europeans’ interest for crusading, notwithstanding repeated vocation support
for the Holy Land. While European settlers of the Levant made numerous appeals for help in the
decades after the Second Crusade and the Papacy issued bulls that called for new campaigns in
1157, 1165, 1166, 1169, 1173, 1181, 1184, and 1187, there was never enough political will to
bring such bulls to life. The Second Crusade’s failure led to a period in which for nearly forty
years European Christian demoralization was reflected in a low level. 109
It was during this period that Nur-ad-Din consolidated his powers on wide partitions of
the Islamic world with the assistance of the religious classes. Obviously, the absence of a strong
Frankish threat, in the form of a new massive campaign, provided Nur-ad-Din with a valuable
time toward the preparations of Jihad against the Crusaders, during which period, Nur-ad-Din
focused on uniting Muslim’s lands. 110 As Kohler argued that after taking Damascus, Nur-adDin preferred to consolidate his powers in Syria rather than embarking Jihad against the
Franks. 111 It seems possible to state that Kohler centered the phenomenon of Jihad on returning
Jerusalem. Therefore, his analysis portrayed negative assessments on the fact that Nur-ad-Din
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concentrated his campaigns on conquering other Muslim territories rather than fighting the
Crusaders over Jerusalem.
Certainly, neither Nur-ad-Din nor his allies anticipated all the consequences of the first
step of association, in particular what would happen if a member-principality chose to secede.
This league, however, was the first among Muslim leaders since the First Crusade to justify the
hegemony and mastery of Nur-ad-Din over other Islamic principalities by proposing a common
just cause, war against the Crusaders. Hope and aspiration do not imply a defined program, but
their presence in the Islamic world is demonstrated by the rapid Islamic coating that enabled
Nur-ad-Din to acquire the decision-making power on the league. In addition, it provided Nur-adDin with manpower and psychology to exert force in the strictest sense, to impose his decisions
and to punish the recalcitrant principalities.
It seems possible to go farther and to state that though coercion of members of ruling
families apparently was regarded as legitimate – and probably even compulsions against citystates and principalities that did not wish to join the league – the need to clear the Islamic lands,
more precisely, Damascus, from the crusader forces influenced the popularity of the vengeance
appeal. This public feeling made it impossible for Muslim leaders to collaborate with the
Franks. By comparison, in the early decades of the twelfth-century, Muslim leaders persuaded a
policy of collaboration with the Franks. 112 For example, at the peak of the First Crusade’s battles
against the Seljuk, the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt collaborated with the Franks against the Seljuk in
order to break the Seljuk’s power.113 For a short time in the history of mankind, it had been

112

The Damascenes’ cooperated with the Franks to drive Zengi away from Damascus;
Ibn Al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicles of The Crusades, 260.
113
Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Vol. X, 186; see also Michael
Kohler, Allianzen und Vertage.
58

proclaimed (even if not believed) that ‘might is not right.’ From this point on, the pattern of
politics in the Islamic world was to alter, “all changed, changed utterly: a terrible beauty is
born.”114 Common sense is right in that instance. The shock and horror of the vast campaign
upon Damascus ended the Damascenes’ – and later on most Muslims – mutual peace with the
outside world and harnessed a new appeal to unite Muslim’s powers in Jihad against the
Franks. 115
This is not to underestimate the league’s appeal, any more than the real fear of further
Crusaders’ invasion. The pull of ideology is never to be underestimated, nor is it easy to
untangle ideology and reality. In a conflict, there is no way to measure the exact respective
balance of the two elements in determining the decision of an endangered nation. Muslim’s
sources, for example, mentioned the painful experience of the Damascenes during the siege of
Damascus. The sources seemed to have shed the light on the death of two members of
Damascus’ religious class, the Malikite imam Yusuf al-Fandalawi and Abd al-Rahman alHalhuli, who died as martyrs in defense of the city. 116 There is no doubt that the religious class
of Damascus offered an emotional impact on repulsing the Second Crusade. They exploited a
real sense of Muslim’s need to embark Jihad against the Franks. No wonder, it was during the
Second Crusade, Ibn Asakir gave public readings of Abd Allah al-Mubark’s Kitab al-Jihad (the
book of the Holy War) in Damascus, which inspired Abu al-Hassan Ibn Munqidah, brother of the
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famous Usama, to volunteer to help raise the siege of Ascalon. 117 Those revised theories of
Jihad, in fact, offered nothing new to the previous ones. Yet that step at this momentum
indicates that reality in the form of the Crusaders’ threat to Damascus met the ideology of Jihad.
The same principle applies on the Baghdadis. Because Baghdad survived, the Islamic
empire survived, at least in theory. However decayed the city became, however much of the
population may have dwindled, it remained the center of politics, diplomacy, administration, and
above all, the source of the Muslims’ identity. If the Crusaders managed to take Damascus,
Baghdad or Cairo would have been the next target. Certainly, that was an assumption, but it is
an obvious one. The Second Crusade’s hegemony on Damascus convinced Muslims that neither
Jerusalem nor the Holy Land was the epitome of their conflict with the Crusaders. Part of the
explanation contributed to the mystery of the Second Crusade’s changing targets from Edessa to
Damascus. In between the original call for the campaign and the expedition’s arrival in the Latin
East, the local population of Edessa attempted a revolt to recapture the city. This, however,
turned out to be a disaster. The rebellion was crushed and the city was deserted. 118 J. Phillips
proposed that with Edessa in ruins, the crusaders had three options: to open a campaign on
Aleppo, to move south and invest the Fatimid-held port of Ascalon, or to attack the city of
Damascus. 119 Out of three options, the Crusaders chose to aim their hegemony on Damascus.
Although Damascus was the largest and most important city in Syria, that was the least
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reasonable choice. Looking back, the Damascenes collaborated with the Franks to drive Zengi’s
forces. 120 Therefore, both the Damascenes and the crusaders shared the same enemy.
In any common sense, opening a campaign on the growing in power Nur-ad-Din of
Aleppo or taking over the rich port of Ascalon would have made much more sense to the
Muslims. The Crusaders’ hegemony on Damascus, however, left the Muslims with one certain
truth that collaborating with the Franks may save them from a certain particular battle, but it
would not save them from the miseries of the war. In addition, Damascus and Baghdad meant
much more than a survival situation to Muslims. Both cities were the core of Muslims’ identity:
an inheritance from the Islamic golden age. Therefore, the campaign on Damascus altered
Muslims’ struggle against the crusaders from battling for the Holy Land to battling for their very
survival and identity. The growing sense of fear and intimidation in Damascus and thereafter in
Baghdad influenced the rising call for Jihad. This step came in the form of the Abbasside
Caliph’s Jihad authorization to all the governors and fiefs of northern Syria. Ibn al-Qalanisi
stated:
In the meantime there had arrived at Damascus the Sharif and amir Shams al-Din
al-Husaini, the Naqib. He had come on from Saif al-Din Ghazi, son of the
Atabek, having been debuted as an envoy from the Caliphate to all the governors
and to the tribes of the Turkmens, to urge them to assist the Muslims and engage
in a Holy War [Jihad] against polytheists [Crusaders].121
Regarding the Caliphal Jihad’s authorization, Köhler proposed that Nur-ad-Din and his
league aimed their propaganda at acquiring the Caliphal legitimacy. 122 Although it is hard to
determine the exact balance of motives, which boosted the Abbasid Sunni Caliph at different
stages, in reality, the Second Crusade’s attack on a major Muslim city like Damascus was an
120
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extensive shift to counter-crusading movements. In hard times, certainly, fear impairs decisionmaking.123 During which time the magnitude of the threat together with the public reaction
impose interests on the ruler. In that situation, Nur-ad-Din and his league presented the last
defensive mechanism to Baghdad, Baghdadis, and the Caliph. In addition, Nur-ad-Din’s power
emerged after the impact of the Second Crusade. Muslim sources, apparently, agreed on the fact
that the Franks withdrew from the gates of Damascus once they realized that Nur-ad-Din
mobilized his army and headed their way. 124 Hence, Nur-ad-Din gained no noteworthy activities
in repulsing the Second Crusade. Accordingly, the Caliph’s call came before the emerging
power of Nur-ad-Din. As the Baghdadis absorbed the danger of the campaign, the Caliph felt the
consequences as well. Such feeling may have influenced the Caliph’s authorization. Hence, the
authorization was, therefore, an inevitable matter on the Caliph who was under the pressure of
his subjects.
Sprinkling Schuller’s terminology of the Athenian empire may help to comprehend the
last point. Indirect domination consists in the fact that it builds on, or attempts to evoke, an
interest of the ruled in the process of being ruled. 125 The Second Crusade created a sense of
reality among the Damascenes, the Muslims of northern Syria and Baghdad that the Crusaders
did not aim their campaigns only at the liberation of Christian Holy Land, but rather at the
invasion of the whole Islamic world. Therefore, the new league became an inevitable matter to
Muslims. This analysis do not dispute that Muslim leaders welcomed the league when it was
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created.126 However, self-defense of the Islamic states was the most obvious protective measure.
The Crusaders twice invaded the Islamic lands, and Muslims had the strong confidence that they
would try again. Therefore, the league remained in existence without a moment’s faltering and
its membership grew, willingly like the case with Damascus 127 or by compulsion like the case
with Egypt.128
In a conflict, a prudent state may ‘voluntarily’, out of a general and wide spread support
of the cause, save itself from the frightful consequences of resistance and ‘involuntary’
subjection, but some states do not. This step depends heavily on the public support of the moral
leadership, whether voluntary or involuntary. If the general public supports the moral authority
of leadership, then they will be more likely to give support both voluntarily and with stronger
commitment to the cause. In this case, lacking the data from the Islamic world with which to
attempt a discussion of such moral sophistications, this next typology will focus on the outcome
of Nur-ad-Din’s expansions on the growing imperial powers of the Islamic state. This study
does not imply by that concentration on economics that Muslims’ religious ideologies do not
merit analysis or that social economics as a worldview and religious theories were separable,
autonomous aspects of the story. This rather meant that most Muslim participants committed
themselves to Jihad with the incentive of worldviews that set a premium on their spiritual health.
Difficult as it is in this case to reveal or even make a moral judgment on the complex motivations
of the Muslims it is worth stressing in order to expose the worldviews that led to the revival of
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Jihad’s practices. The primary discussion here is how and why converting other Islamic
principalities and city-states into Nur-ad-Din’s league concerned the Muslim general population.
In particular, what material benefits did the general population obtain from this endeavor? Did
the imperial economy bring back the social justice to the Islamic world? Finally, did the power
of an empire influence the practical magnitude of Jihad? Unfortunately, interference in internal
affairs is less well understood, largely because of the inadequacy of the evidence and sources.
Therefore, the emphasis on a system of social analysis might bridge the gap between Muslims’
myth of the early Islamic empire and their enthusiasm toward Jihad.
In any study of the Islamic state, military service and tributes must be considered
together, because the Islamic state, for the most, manipulated both.129 The difference before the
Second Crusade that the Atabegs privatized both objects for personal purposes.130 Once Nur-adDin claimed leadership on the league, each principality or city-state that joined the league
contributed either cash or soldiers. Ibn al-Qalanisi attributed on Nur-ad-Din’s request from the
Damascenes, “you support me with the Askar [army or soldiers] of Damascus, and we aid one
another in waging the Holy War [Jihad].” 131 As time went on, Nur-ad-Din whittled down
members of the league until, his name became the sole political leader over roughly all Syrian
and Egyptian provinces. In common sense, Nur-ad-Din’s growing authority restricted the
dominance of other Muslim ruling families. This step indicates that Nur-ad-Din’s power came at
the cost of other members of ruling families rather than at the expense of the subjects. In
essence, Nur-ad-Din concentrated his wars and expansions, gradually, to reoccupy the Islamic
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lands. If what follows, therefore, has a static appearance, that is because Muslims affiliated the
accomplishments of the Islamic state under the leadership of Nur-ad-Din with that of the early
Islamic empire. That is to consider moral and material endeavors.
Nonetheless, the oral tradition of events in the Islamic world focused heavily on the
religious dimension of the movements, which Nur-ad-Din employed for his expansions. This is
to imply that references to Nur-ad-Din in the Islamic sources are too skimpy, too unreliable,
often regarded the Islamic zeal of Nur-ad-Din’s activities only, and without underpins to the
financial implications. One of the commonplaces of Islamic political rhetoric was that
chroniclers often tended not to change the glorious past of the Islamic empire. Not only
prudence, but also fairness, justice, glory, and, above all, self-affiliation with the community that
once dominated the Near East defended this principle. For example, Ibn al-Athir stated on Nurad-Din, “I have read the histories of early kings before Islam, and in Islam until these time of
ours, and I have not seen after the Rightly Guided Caliphs and Umar Ibn Abd al-Aziz, a king of
better conduct than the just king Nur-ad-Din.”132 The consideration of justice, glory, and
historical victories surely explains why Ibn al-Athir liked to suppose the comparative between
Nur-ad-Din and the early Islamic Caliphs.
In fact, the religious class depicted the patronage image, which Nur-ad-Din gained
throughout his career. According to Elisseeff, after the capture of Damascus, Nur-ad-Din took
each step in the name of Jihad against the Crusaders.133 Elisseeff took this reverential tone
directly from the chroniclers themselves. Ibn al-Adim stated, – probably more out of piety than
132
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convections – “ from this point Nur-ad-Din dedicated himself to Jihad.”134 Ibn al-Qalanisi
attributed on the religious career of Nur-ad-Din, “I seek nothing but the good of the Muslims and
to make war against the Franks.” 135 Al-Asfhani, the future advisor of Saladin as well, described
Nur-ad-Din as ‘the most chaste, pious, sagacious, pure and virtuous of Kings.’ Al-Asfhani
praised Nur-ad-Din for restoring ‘the splendor of Islam to the land of Syria.’136 Furthermore, the
later chronicler Abu Shama described Nur-ad-Din as the most zealous in raiding the Franks. 137 It
is certainly possible to demythologize this picture of Nur-ad-Din. The German scholar Köhler
argued that Nur-ad-Din’s efforts in the service of Jihad in the first half of his career was not
impressive, and his usage of Jihad’s propaganda as an instrument was only for political
purposes.138
Meanwhile, this massive religious coating indicates to the growing aspirations and hopes
of Muslims’ counter-crusading at the time of Nur-ad-Din, it demonstrates the social ethos,
splendor, and justice. Though vital to the religious dimension of Nur-ad-Din’s military
operations, examining the economic implications will indicate the limit of available stimulus for
large-scale warfare. Economics were to the Muslims (and generally in the medieval world) an
integral part of successful warfare and of the expansion of powers of a state or in this case, of
merging a number of states into an empire. 139 Nur-ad-Din’s expansions, therefore, brought back
into the Islamic world, the large-scale human institution, namely ‘the Empire.’ The argument is
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intense, and suffers the lack of statistics from the Islamic sources, but comparisons and contrasts
between Nur-ad-Dins expansions and the previous Omayyad expansions, will be illuminating.
That is to mean that all broad classificatory terms ‘Empire’ embrace a wide spectrum of
individual instance, which is the obvious analogy.
Consequently, it is important to consider the two offsetting of tributes and military
services after the foundation of Nur-ad-Din’s State. A tribute, in its narrow sense, is of course
only one way that an imperial state drains funds from subject-states for its treasury. The shift
among Muslims there that Nur-ad-Din’s authority replaced that of the previous rulers of
subjected principalities. Hence, Nur-ad-Din patronage ended the fiscal rights, which previously
the Islamic state gave to members of ruling families over Muslim lands and businesses. 140 This
is not to propose that Nur-ad-Din exempted subject-states from paying tributes. Instead, his
administration took the tributes directly for the state institution as a replacement for wasting
much of it on the middle-beneficiaries. In essence, this step boosted the levy of Nur-ad-Din’s
state at the expense of Muslim ruling families and reduced the financial burden on the peasants’
class. The case of Nur-ad-Din’s gradual occupation of Egypt is a decisive example. It started
out when Nur-ad-Din made an agreement with the Fatimid to help protecting Egypt from the
Frankish siege in return for a Fatimid payment of one million dinars. When the Franks
intensified their pressure on the Fatimid government, Nur-ad-Din requested one-third of the
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revenues of Egypt.141 Shortly after, Nur-ad-Din outset the Fatimid government and claimed the
whole revenues for his state.142
As for the large-scale military campaigns, engagements were both expensive and
unpredictable, to the participants if not to later historians, even those with heavy advantages on
one side. It required time and funds for Nur-ad-Din to subdue Egypt. Gradually, Egypt
appeared to be a great tribute-paying possession. The Fatimid Empire, in general, had a
reputation for being rich, which the massive constructions in Cairo confirmed it. 143 Egypt then
became a major contributor to Nur-ad-Din’s campaigns. Unfortunately, no budget for Nur-adDin’s state has survived, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, Egyptian revenues
formed thirty to forty percent of the total Ottoman budget. 144 Furthermore, Ibn al-Athir stated on
Nur-ad-Din’s campaign to Egypt, “Asad al-Din [the general of Nur-ad-Din’s campaign] should
dwell among them with an army and that their financial support should also come from
Egypt.”145 This statement indicates that the expansion aimed at covering the campaign’s costs
and the soldiers’ payments. A long season of expansion probably meant active campaigning, and
this gave greater hopes of booty to offset expenditure. The domination over trade routes between
Egypt and Syria created an extensive mine for employment in commercial businesses, especially,
in the absence of trade interruptions by the Crusaders and other Muslim ruling elites.
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By suppressing the piracy and brigandage of other Muslim military leaders, Nur-ad-Din
brought back to the Islamic world the extensive territorial dominions. In addition, these
expansions brought back into Nur-ad-Din’s institution large traces of lands with access to
waterways trade, together with larger traces of inland territories with unlimited access to
overland trade routes and communication. It boosted the Levy and the self-sufficiently on the
large estates, peace and war and, more importantly, the changing rule of the state with the
development of the large territorial empires. 146 As Nur-ad-Din’s empire expanded, mercantilism
correspondingly expanded. Indeed, from the first Arab-Islamic empire of the seventh-century to
the Ottomans – the last great Islamic empire – the rise and fall of imperial mercantilism was the
story of the Near East and perhaps even further, the story of the universe. 147 Furthermore,
psychologically, the military expansions were useful for all Muslims, since they represented a
way of resolving the tension of the Islamic societies at the expense of other Atabegs and the
Crusaders, rather than on the poor strata class.
Nur-ad-Din’s state enjoyed strong and expanding urban networks, growing consumer
demands, increasing range of manufacturing activities, and highly commercialized economy. 148
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More decisively, Nur-ad-Din used his military power to protect the trading business. 149 In
return, the nobility class contributed cash to Nur-ad-Din’s campaigns. Ibn al-Athir stated on the
campaign Nur-ad-Din’s campaign to Egypt, “they had been at Damietta, during which Saladin
[Saladin was yet Nur-ad-Din’s general] expended untold sums of money. I was told that he said,
‘I have never seen anyone more generous than al-Adid; [an Egyptian nobleman] during the time
the Franks were before Damietta he sent me a million dinars, apart from clothes and other
things.”150 Regardless of the exaggerated sum, it seems that the more prosperous Muslims in the
upper class supported the imperial advances of Nur-ad-Din. Concretely, how did the prosperous
class benefit? There is a total silence in the literary sources of this question, but rational
economic goals, certainly, were among the motivations of their contributions and support.
On the other hand, the common people, the poorer strata, were both the driving force
behind, and the beneficiaries of, the imperial growth. At the head of the extensive list was the
end of the Atabegs’ fiscal rights over land and trade. Add to the work in farms and trade, the
total cash benefits to poor Muslims, though not measurable, it was certainly there. 151 Above all,
the empire and its benefits brought back the centralization of power to the Islamic state. To
explain the last point, Nur-ad-Din’s state manipulated a disciplinary constitution that served a
whole society. More precisely, Nur-ad-Din’s institution of the state manipulated the use of force
for rational economic objects. Therefore, rational production and commercial politics triggered
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the aims of power politics within Nur-ad-Din’s state.152 Beyond that, Nur-ad-Din’s expansions
managed to tame Muslims’ military powers. The expansion process provided regular payments
for the military elites, this time from the accumulations of booty and tributes. Ibn al-Athir stated
on Nur-ad-Din’s campaign to Egypt, “Nur al-Din gave every man with Asad al-Din twenty
dinars as a bonus, not counted as part of his pay.” 153 This point particularly marked Nur-adDin’s success, because his campaigns administered the greatest military achievement to lock
economic growth to his state, and in retrospect, to Muslim subjects.
To be sure, the Islamic world maintained a standing army before the impact of the First
Crusade, and continued to do so. After the end of expansions, the Islamic state failed to provide
regular payments to the army. Instead, it granted military officers the fiscal right to collect land
revenues for their salaries. Nonetheless, the Islamic state failed to control the power of the army
throughout this process. Similarly, the capstone structure of Nur-ad-Din’s army remained from
the Turkic elites and the Atabegs, an organization designed to bring about professional and
discipline warriors.154 Although there is no evidence of whether (or not) Muslim subjects chose
to serve in Nur-ad-Din’s army physically, the later experience demonstrated that, without the
imperial income, it was impossible to pay so large a body of soldiers regularly. Fundamental
measures require powerful stimuli and unprecedented necessary conditions. Taking trade for
example, Muslims succeeded to maintain imports and exports even after the foundation of the
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Crusader States.155 Nonetheless, it seemed comprehensible to everyone that the imperial power
guaranteed higher levels of those imports as a strong and united army supported and protected it.
For example, Ibn al-Athir documented the account of two Muslim merchandise-ships set out
from Egypt to Syria and anchored at the port of Lattakia. There, the Franks ceased the ships and
the merchandise. In response, Nur-ad-Din conducted a military campaign towards the Frankish
cities of Arqa and Tripoli until the Franks gave back the stolen goods. 156 This decisive fact
indicates that the empire granted safer and higher trade measures. In retrospect, the imperial
power provided both the necessary cash and the political means toward the practical warfare.157
Apart from acquisitions of property among Muslims in Nur-ad-Din’s empire, the imperial
income enabled Nur-ad-Din to demonstrate the financial growth of his state without adding
finical burden on Muslim subjects. He used the income to construct splendid public buildings in
the form of religious monuments as a part of his aim to revitalize Islam to stimulate popular
approach to Jihad. Such monuments – because their inscriptions often dated them precisely –
provide an inevitable historical evidence of not only Nur-ad-Din’s popular temptation to the
Islamic zeal, but also to the financial strength of his state. Those colossal landmarks confirmed
the popular image of Nur-ad-Din as the leader who stimulates his financial power for the good of
Islam and the Muslims. More precise, this noteworthy shift indicates the religious dimension,
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which all chroniclers, though came from diverse cultures in the Islamic world and wrote from
different perspectives, displayed on the image of Nur-ad-Din. 158
Furthermore, the patronage image and the religious dimension demonstrate how the
religious class coated Nur-ad-Din’s movements with right intent. This is not to reveal Nur-adDin true intent. Nonetheless, the gradual success of the imperial economy coated the power
politics with an Islamic virtue. Not only did it secure Muslims’ survival needs, but also it made
the moral economy available. As for the issue of the Second Crusade, Muslims overcame the
probability of defeat, but a charismatic leader arose to stir his people into fighting. The fight at
this point seemed just in theory for at this point it required Muslims to fight for the state itself:
the epitome of their identity. In practical terms, the fight seemed possible for the power of an
empire provided the necessary means for such large-scale military campaigns.
One more facet to the ideological revival of justice in the time of Nur-ad-Din was his
establishment of a ‘House of Justice’ in Damascus. The timing of this particular building was
not a coincident. Certainly, this monument prevailed Nur-ad-Din’s popular temptations toward
the religious atmosphere of counter-crusading. Thus, in the House of Justice, Nur-ad-Din, or one
of his appointed deputies, presided over sessions in which Muslim subjects brought their
grievances to address them to the ruler.159 Ibn al-Athir went further to claim that Nur-ad-Din
himself used to set in the House of Justice two days a week, with the judges and the legists to
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listen to the people’s grievances. 160 It seems that the continuous success of the empire gave
Muslim subjects a sense of justice and made civil peace possible. It is not a surprise that both
chroniclers and inscriptions attributed the image of Nur-ad-Din to the ‘Just King’.161
Sprinkling the Weberian terminology, the imperial growth reflected a sense of shared
identity in the Islamic society. This is not a surprise for Muslims’ memories preserved an
idealistic image of the glorious past of the Islamic empire; and as soon as it seemed possible,
Muslims determined to fight for it. It is worth stressing that the Islamic empire was more to
Muslims than a mere state, it was a holy and sovereign state: a community and a religion that
once dominated the entire Middle East and an identity that marked Muslims’ success for
centuries. For that cause, the fight met the general population’s psychological need of justice
and provided the reconciliation between the desire of salvation and the need to fight. Moreover,
Muslim subjects viewed Nur-ad-Din’s administration that created the so-called godly blessing
wealth as a legitimate authority. The issue of righteous intentions, therefore, coated the act of
war. Hence, the social solidarity brought Jihad’s religious theories together with the practices,
because the power of a holy empire succeeded to unite the means, goals and efforts of its
subjects for a common just cause. Only under this term, the practical magnitude of Jihad turned
from the preserve of the noble elites into a totally mainstream activity, accepted and endorsed by
an entire society. More accurately, it activates the practical concept of Jihad by the wide number
of Muslim citizens who supported the wars.162
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To be sure, this approach does not imply any temptation to label Nur-ad-Din’s
expansions, ‘wartime measures.’ Although ambitious, it ignores the fact that the concept
‘wartime measures’ involves numerous campaigns and consistent warfare. 163 However, what
this approach proposes is that such an aim was a direct result of dominating trade accumulations.
Nur-ad-Din took that step in that direction as he was able and found it advantageous. Short of
going to war, there was no more useful instrument for punishing enemies, rewarding ‘friends’,
and persuading ‘neutrals’ to become friends; and if employment of the instrument meant going to
war, tant pis. The rising imperial power implied that Nur-ad-Din could similarly control all
independent Islamic provinces.164 Potentially, the growth of his territory meant higher tributes;
and with the backing of flowing resources, the religious class, the subjects, and a strong
formidable army, he could deny any and every province in the Near East access to important
trade routes.
Of course, Nur-ad-Din had the ability, but it is surly hard to determine whether the aim
itself was (or was not) thinkable. That is to commit the hegemony-into-empire once again. This
may explain the voluntary subjection of northern Syria. Certainly, many Islamic provinces
together with the Crusader States had comparable needs to import. Nur-ad-Din, at this point,
could block them partially if not completely. Furthermore, in the absence of genuinely
commercial and competitive motives, Nur-ad-Din restricted Muslims’ interference in the trading
activities of one another, as those issues arose ad hoc in the growth of the empire. Only after the
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Second Crusade, which radically altered the scale of operations and the stakes, did it become
necessary to make massive use of the trade-blocking instrument.
Although the Crusader States, surely, suffered from the growing imperial power of Nurad-Din, concretely, who in Nur-ad-Din’s state benefited (or suffered) from the empire, how and
to what extent? In what follows, this study shall remain within the narrow framework; to draw
attentions to the way socioeconomic factors influenced the rise of counter-crusading
movements.165 It is clear that Muslims combined the history of the Islamic empire with Islam
itself. Therefore, a Muslim piousness and willingness to submit and defend the holy empire
made the embrace of an all-consuming Islamic identity an attractive alternative to the allencompassing socioeconomic factors of the Islamic empire. Nonetheless, economic factors not
only facilitated the act of war but also revived Muslims memories of the great Islamic empire.
Consequently, Nur-ad-Din’s success minimized the distance between the glorious past and the
actual present. More accurately, it minimized the distance between Muslims’ shocking defeat of
the First Crusade and their victory over the Second Crusade.
It seems compelling that the empire directly profited Muslim general population to an
extent known in the Islamic world through memory preservations of the great Islamic empire at
the ages of the Omayyad and the early Abbasid. There was a price, of course, the costs of
constant warfare. Men were lost in engagements, most shatteringly in the Second Crusade and
thereafter. Nonetheless, it seems possible to state that there is no direct connection between the
empire and the theoretical Jihad for juries’ contribution to provide legal theories of Jihad existed
well before and after the First and Second Crusades without any significant changes in the
165
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methods. This is not to deny that the power of the Islamic empire boosted juries’ motivation but
rather to imply that juries’ contribution continued regardless of the material conditions of the
empire. On the other hand, the connection between the practical Jihad and the empire was
obvious. War was an endemic justice: everyone accepted that as a fact, and therefore no one
seriously argued, or believed, that giving up the empire would relive Muslims of the miseries of
war. It would merely relieve them of certain particular wars, and the loss of the empire and its
moral and material benefits did not seem worth that dubious gain.
With the empire, Muslims morale remained buoyant to the end, reflecting their calculus
of the moral and material profits and losses. Repeatedly, this is not to imply that economic
factors motivated Muslims’ holy war. In any common sense, the imperial profit appeared
gradually years after the impact of the Second Crusade. The point is that the impact of the
Second Crusade drove Muslims survival instinct to the level of necessity by which war became
inescapable. Then, Muslims victory over the Second Crusade convinced Muslims that they were
fighting for a holy cause. This step coupled with higher aspirations to bring back the great
Islamic empire, which for centuries dominated the Near East, benefited all its citizens, and
became affiliated to the very meaning of the definition ‘Muslims.’ To avoid definition’s
contortions, the holy cause changed rapidly; and with each success, Muslims believed that they
were on the right track for God blessed their cause. Therefore, everyone tolerated the ideas of
holy and just wars.
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It is worth stressing at this point that there is no program of imperialism there, no theory,
merely a reassertion of the universal medieval belief in the holy naturalness of domination.166 In
Aristotle words:

The free rules over the servile in one way, the male over the female in another,
and the man over the child in yet another. All the partners possess the elements on
the human mind, but they possess them in different ways. The slave does not have
the faculty of deliberation at all. The female has it but in an indefinite form. The
child has it but in an imperfect form.167
The power of an empire boosted Muslims’ hopes and aspirations in their struggle against the
crusaders. Therefore, it was no surprise that the failure of the Second Crusade ushered in a
period in which for the years following the Second Crusade Muslims’ morale was reflected in a
high level under the leaderships of Nur-ad-Din. Aspirations, gradually, went as high as
Jerusalem itself. After the death of Nur-ad-Din, al-Isfhani stated, “by the light of his
discernment the just prince Nur-ad-Din Mahmud Ibn Zengi had known in his time about the
conquest of Jerusalem after him.” 168 This is not to admit that the return of Jerusalem to the
Islamic dominion motivated Nur-ad-Din’s activities. Though the religious class’s interpretations
supported that approach, historians are free to make their ethical verdict. However, the power of
the empire, surely, boosted the expectations.
Nur-ad-Din’s dominion was of course an abstraction of the Islamic world, and to
appreciate the significance of this point, the label ‘empire’ referred to an actual political state,
not label on a religious community, namely ‘Sunni State.’ Although he conquered the most
formidable Shi’ite institution, the Fatimid, the ideology remained incessant. Hillenbrand argued
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that, the ideological enmity between the Shi’ite and the Sunni was deeply entrenched and in
practice it was almost unthinkable for them to form a united Islamic front against the
Crusaders.169 Despite the fact that sectarian divisions continued within Nur-ad-Din’s state, the
sense of freedom emerged. For centuries, scholars have exercised their minds in vain to find a
workable definition of ‘freedom.’ This is not to add yet another attempt to the mountain of
explanations, for in any normal sense, the term to be defined regarding each social perception to
the antithesis of ‘un-freedom.’ The reason is that the rights recognized in a given society
constitute a bundle of claims, privileges, powers, and immunities un-evenly distributed among
the individual members, in other words, the unequal privileges of citizenship. Though unequal,
citizens shared the at least standard of privileges that shapes a common identity.
For centuries under the imperial power, Muslim subjects shared the rights to survive, to
subsist, to dominate, and to belong to a common community. This strong and dominating
community characterized the epitome of the definition ‘Muslims,’ namely the great Islamic
Empire; and to avoid running into conceptual contortions, the concept ‘freedom’ there brought
back both moral and material privileges to the concept ‘Muslims.’ Given the long traditions of
the concept ‘Muslims,’ the freedom there provided Muslims with a shared sense of insurance
from the mysterious future regardless of their sectarian, social, and cultural diversity because it
combined the fulfillment of their worldly needs with the fulfillment of their religious obligations.
Beyond that, it is surely hard to determine whether (or not) Nur-ad-Din’s motivations
represented a moral leader of Jihad. Looking back, historians are free to make their own moral
judgments. However, Nur-ad-Din imperial approach employed all the forms of material
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exploitation that were available and possible in that society, and to the turbulent Muslims, his
leadership provided very powerful motives to support his campaigns: hope, aspiration, honor,
fear, general interest, and above all the sense of self-affiliation to a paramount holy and
sovereign identity. In Ibn Khladun’s words:
The end of social solidarity is sovereignty. This is because, as we have said
before, it is solidarity, which makes men unite their efforts for common objects,
defending themselves, and repulse or overcome the enemies. We have also seen
that every human society requires a restraint, and a chief who can keep men from
injuring themselves. Such a chief must command a powerful support, else he will
not be able to carry out his restraining function. 170

The conclusion seems compelling. The impact of Second Crusade created a state of
general panic in Damascus, which then extended to all the surrounding Islamic major cities. A
single survival instinct pressed Muslims into alliance for the first time since the impact of the
First Crusade. The panic triggered a call for sovereignty; anyone at this point could call himself,
God’s appointee on earth. Experience and practical judgments determined the choices and the
limits. Nur-ad-Din was certainly fortunate that he started his career at this turning point. The
religious class continued to offer the theological call for the Jihad, which gave the religious
dimension to Nur-ad-Din’s expansions. His expansions, in return, brought back the empire
institution with all its benefits. Muslim subjects did nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to
human practice, in accepting an empire when it was offered to them, and then in refusing to give
it up. After the Second Crusade, public opinion was reluctant to reverse itself once it has
acknowledged the validity of an institution, the legitimacy of the practice and the exercise of
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rights. In the just war thinking, Muslims acknowledged the presence of the legitimate authority,
legitimate cause, and right intent.
As for the concept ‘Jihad’, Humphereys’ proposed that it is a plastic one, which can be
deployed in widely varying ways for varying ends. 171 Concretely, what Muslim actions reflected
(or not) a true Jihad is imprecise. Hence, it is better to leave this subject to each historian’s own
moral tendency toward the argument. However, it looks now as though notions of vengeance
played a relatively minor part. Perhaps vengeance existed in the Jihad’s theological approach,
but the practices reflected a different cause, human’s survival instinct. Materialism explanations
may sound odd in correlation with religious issues, but how can one detach ideology from
reality. Ideologies are the products of the complicated human organizations. That is something,
but it is hardly enough to solve the puzzle. Be that as it may, ideologies thrive only when they
meet the practices. To say this is not to deny the moral value of such ideology. Jihad will
always be an important individual duty to Muslims. However, rotating the concept from an
individual duty into a mass movement depends on the scale and the strength of the harmony
between the human institution of the state and its subjects. Nur-ad-Din re-drew his dominion on
Muslims’ imperial inheritance, which for centuries institutionalized the important features of a
community and its roles, more precise, the rule, the army and the general population.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
It is a common place to state that the major issue that hindered Muslims from embracing
Jihad in practical terms was the lack of adaptability, above all, what about the imperial state?
Potentially, it was a decisive consideration in itself. Its use was in the one process, production: a
process of immense importance to society. Every rational argument suggests quick and
widespread adaption. It would not be far wrong to say that from the seventh-century to the
impact of the crusades, landed wealth represented the great wealth and revenue in the Islamic
world, and that new wealth came majorly from wars and politics not from enterprise. Therefore,
the role of the Islamic state carried a massive transformation in the centuries following the
massive Islamic expansions. Materialistically, the expansions brought about all the interest of
the imperial revenue. Muslims claimed great quantities of land, improved and extended the
public capital, supported arts and sciences. Given the cessation of the expansions, Muslims did
not develop new economic systems to use and innovate enterprise widely instead of wars.
Consequently, this step transformed the role of the Islamic state once again. This time, the
transformation brought negative assessments on Muslim subjects.
The oral tradition of events in the Islamic world, however, presented only the moral
benefits of the Islamic empire. Islamic sources focused on the fact that the rise of the Islamic
Empire was not simply an imperial conquest of the Near and Middle East; it was the creation,
establishment, and spread of a new religion. This line of argument mythologized the history of
the Islamic empire and turned the imperial traditions into deep beliefs affiliated with the religion
itself. Given both approaches together, Muslims embraced Jihad practically, when the interest,
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the available means, the domination, the necessary intellectual theories, and above all hopes and
aspiration for salvation. Muslims, however, carried all within one umbrella, the imperial power.
Yet, the fact is that, though the Islamic empire continued to exist before and after the First
Crusade, though the interest seemed to have been present and the necessary intellectual theories
continued on, Muslims did not advance the practical Jihad. A simple pointing out to alternative
values cannot dismiss this question when one of those values was a very powerful desire for
salvation that should meet the necessary means for the large-scale warfare.
However, in any common sense the Holy War is the attempt to bridge the gap between
religious ideals and worldly violence, between morals and materials and between the theories
and the practices. This is to imply that religious theories and practical warfare were not
autonomous aspects of the story; they were actually a two-headed coin. There is no way to
separate ideology from reality. Unquestionably, it is hard to dispute the argument in this
particular instance that Muslims were able to embrace Jihad without both the revival of
economic life and the arrival of more settled social relations. Like all generalizations, this one as
well countered with exceptions. This meant that such a broad statement demands some
qualifications. It does not amount to an adolescent acceptance of stated motivations, or to an
attempt to evaluate religious thinking free of its social setting. This rather meant that most
Muslim participants committed themselves to Jihad with the impetus of a worldview that set a
premium on their spiritual health and above all their chances of salvation. The point is that for
the majority of Muslim participants it is undeniable that Jihad proved to be a profoundly (though
not obsessively) religious experience to express their worldviews. Therefore, it would be naive
to underestimate the obvious addition of the ‘right point’, which provide the rational
qualifications for the Jihad. This meant that at the ‘right point’ all participants’ diverse
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worldviews share one paramount identity, high cause and goal, which add a cover of legitimacy
on the act of war, regardless of the multi-motivations.
To begin a terminology, it seems persuasive that the relationship between the theoretical
and practical fields of Jihad showed a great assimilating power, the power of imposing its
spiritual ascendancy even when it could not control the material conditions. For an active Jihad,
however, a balance established itself between legal theories and legal practices and between
morals and materials: an uneasy truce between Muslim juries on a side and the political
authorities (the state) and Muslim subjects on the other side. By applying this examination on
the Islamic world between the First and Second Crusades, it appears compelling that Muslim
juries provided consistent legal theories in both cases, regardless of the material conditions. The
aim of Muslim legists was, therefore, not to make wars, but rather to understand the nature of
war, to tame it, and to promote it according to the necessity and the surrounding circumstances.
The only significant point on the theoretical field came after the impact of the First Crusade
when al-Sulami preached that provincial rulers did not require the Caliph authorization, perhaps
concerned more by the desperate necessity rather than the legitimate one. The practices,
however, witnessed a noteworthy change after the impact of the disastrous Second Crusade.
This, certainly, indicates that the Second Crusade resembled the ‘right point’ to the practical field
of Jihad. In return, it is obvious to state that the impact of Second Crusade was the ‘right point’
to the relationship between the human institution of the state and its Muslim subjects.
The second chapter stressed the power, prosperity and stability of the Islamic state
throughout the foundation of the early Islamic Empire, and until the closing of the eighthcentury. That empire was very different in a number of ways from the Islamic world at the age
of the crusades, let alone conjures up image of marching armies, massive constructions, and
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Arabic language. None of these characterized the Islamic world when the First Crusade struck
the Near East. The striking forces of the Islamic world were now nomadic Turks. Every
superpower seeks the last innovation of super-weaponry; and the nomadic Turks were the best
innovation. Yet, arguably the indirect consequences were worse. The stateless nature of the
nomadic societies was a particular problem for the Muslims in that it was impossible to control
them by diplomacy. Such technique only works if there is an acknowledged leader with whom
one can establish binding agreements. No one of the Atabegs had that kind of lasting authority.
Even so there is an underlying continuity behind its culture changes, and, despite
fluctuation, it was still the Islamic Empire (Caliphate), and known as such to its citizens and
enemies. Certainly, its subjects still called themselves Muslims and referred to Baghdad as ‘the
Caliph city.’ All make clear that the process of Muslims’ self-identification with the empire was
a continued one: an admiration nostalgia that grew into a myth. In reality, however, both the
Islamic empire and the Caliph were merely memories. Nonetheless, it was still the same empire,
which had dominated the Near East from the seventh-century; this time it was in fragments.
This, however, give some indications of a divided attitude between the past and the present.
Muslims voluntarily exchanged the present sense of separateness for a sense of belonging to the
much larger and much stronger community. It seems possible to go further and to state that
Muslims lived in a daydream state: a memory of an empire. Therefore, to understand what
qualifications made the impact of the Second Crusade, the ‘right point’ for the practical Jihad, it
was important to shed the light on the social economic changes in the Islamic Empire.
In the eighth century, Muslims, respectively, occupied far more territories. Sending the
population out and bringing in additional means in the form of booty and tributes could absorb a
rising population. Both, however, were stopgaps, not solutions, and to appreciate the
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significance of this point, the term Muslims, in reality, changed over time from a label of an
actual politic, religion, and economic unite (the empire) into abstractions, not labels on actual
political state. They were merely the consequences of population outstripping the available
means. The use of slaves created a new relative class in the Islamic world, and reordered the
pre-existing social classes. Certainly, this reordering brought negative assessments on the
general population. The pursuit of limited resources brought internal warfare to the Islamic
world. Private capital, it is true, promotes and operates many of the possible innovations.
This, however, was not the case. There were enough individuals who possessed the
resources, but not among the men whose interest lay in production. Add to the list the landhunger of the Atabegs, which depopulated the productive rural areas at the expense of
overpopulating the Islamic cities. The wide gap between production and consumption, surely,
led to inflation. All these factors transformed the function of the Islamic state from serving a
whole community to serving individual Atabegs’ ideologies. Living in a state of social
disorientation, Muslim subjects could not find a way to serve the state. These facts marginalized
Muslim subjects and kept them from participating in politics and wars. Though disoriented,
Muslims could not bridge the gap between the myth of Islamic empire and the reality that this
empire was no longer a superpower.
Therefore, the first qualification for the impact of the Second Crusade over the First is,
certainly, the psychological element. Although the impact of the First Crusade was not a
surprise, Muslims seemed to have underestimated the crusader forces. Thus, Muslims’
humiliating defeat had evidently dealt a blow to the cause of Jihad in the Islamic world.
Probably, the cumulative effect of centuries of literary and architectural recordings of the
glorious Islamic empire had contributed to a widespread Muslim belief that God approved their
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domination and that they would always be victorious. Hence, when the First Crusade defeated
the Muslims so dismally, Muslim morals plummeted too. It seems certain that the defeat had an
impact upon Muslims’ enthusiasm toward Jihad, notwithstanding repeated vocations in support
of waging the holy war without any practical response. As Muslim subjects absorbed the
outcome of the defeat, Muslim leaders ignored the fact. Such feelings contributed to modus
vivendi with the crusaders; and while both Muslim leaders and subjects accepted the Crusader
States as a reality, the impact of the Second Crusade re-stir the struggle once again. This time,
Muslims over-estimated the campaign. The call for Jihad was fundamental. Armies from
allover the Syrian provinces answered the appeal. Hence, Muslims’ victory over the vast
campaign demythologized the invincibility of the crusaders and re-bridged the gap between the
myth of the Islamic empire and the victorious reality.
The second qualification is the hegemony on Damascus. Although Damascus had no
such a religious significance to Muslims like Jerusalem, the impact escalated the countercrusading movements. In Hillenbrand words, “Jerusalem always had its political price so long as
the Franks still desired to possess it.”172 Perhaps for Jerusalem denoted a religious significant,
but it was not a case of surviving necessity to the general population. By contrast, Damascus
implied a survival necessity to Muslims from the Damascenes, let alone, Damascus’ religious
significance as the Omayyad’s city. It is worth stressing that Muslims survived the Second
Crusade by drawing on their imperial inheritance. One aspect of that inheritance was the site of
the former imperial capital (Damascus), and the land-walls built in the eighth-century.
Nonetheless, the aggression on Damascus made it obvious to Muslims that neither Jerusalem nor
the Holy Land was the center of their conflict with the crusaders, but rather, their own very
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existence. Therefore, Muslims – regardless of their sectarian, political and ideological
differences – shared a survival instinct. Muslims were now battling for their very survival, and
to do so they would have to adapt, but equally they could only survive by drawing on their
imperial inheritance built up over centuries.
The third qualification stood in the formalistic league of Muslim provinces. This step
reflected the strength of the appeal to oust the crusaders. Muslims had not called for a united
Islamic force since the impact of the First Crusade. This specific step characterized the prime of
the turning point. Indeed, the extent of fear from further crusades justified the leagues’
hegemony on other Muslim leaders who refused to join the league. Although the impact of the
Second Crusade provided a short momentum for the revival of Muslims’ sense of Jihad, the
gradual transformation of the league into an empire kept the momentum alive. Defeating the
Second Crusade probably meant to Muslims that they were fighting for God’s cause in that
particular battle. However, the steady economic success followed Nur-ad-Din’s expansions
confirmed that message. Nur-ad-Din’s reoccupation of the Islamic lands revitalized Muslims
memories of the previous Islamic empire, which by the standards of the pre-industrial world was
a powerful, well-organized and wealthy state. It had survived two centuries of political, cultural,
administrative, social and economical crisis. Driven back into Egypt, Palestine and Syria, the
empire could be again a great power. By the at least psychological standards, this step was
enough to fuel hope and aspiration into Muslims.
The issue of the identity is, of course, the fourth qualification. Tracing Muslim sources,
Muslims resented their identity variance with one another including the crusaders after the First
Crusade. The analysis of Muslim sources of the First Crusade, though, it put them all at odd
with one another, every single chronicler identified the self and the community to which he
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belonged as ‘Muslims.’ That was not a surprise, but rather it was the inheritance of, first,
centuries of a community that once dominated the Near East, second, two centuries of social and
cultural crisis followed the gradual cession of the role of the state and the lack of adaptability.
By contrast, it seems convincing from the massive harmony in Muslim sources that the impact of
the Second Crusade reshaped Muslims identity. It spurred higher hopes and expectations among
Muslims to bring back the great Islamic empire with all its spiritual and material meanings. This
time, Muslims resented only their variance with the Franks; and to avoid definition contortions,
the concept ‘Muslims’ meant the community of people who belonged to the superpower of the
Near East. Muslims used this identity to differentiate themselves from Latin Christendom.
Taking the Greeks as an analogous example, for centuries the Greeks resembled their variance
with one another. Only after the massive Persian invasion when the definition ‘Greek’ defined
all inhabitants of the Greek’s main lands: and it simply meant the super-strong community that
defeated the Persians.173 This step, in return, provided Muslims with one paramount identity to
fight, for it united the state’s administration and the subjects into the struggle with the crusaders.
Beyond the process of simply getting the qualifications for the necessary force of men
stands the formidable logistic problem of Jihad’s necessity. This quest meant to explain whether
(or not) Muslims’ practical warfare implied a necessity for the constant hegemony against the
Crusaders after defeating the Second Crusade. To answer this point, it is worth stressing the
situation of the Crusader States after the Second Crusade. Certainly, the Crusader States suffered
a major downfall without any further Islamic military campaigns. In the forty years followed the
Second Crusade, the Crusader States underwent internal warfare, disintegration and above all

173

Ernle Bradford, Thermopylae: The Battle for The West (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo
Press, 1980), 21-22.
89

economical crisis. 174 This was the obvious result to Nur-ad-Din’s domination over the Near
East’s fertile crescent (Egypt and Syria) and its trade routes. Without these prospects, the
Crusader States increasingly decayed. Thus, Nur-ad-Din now forced the Crusader States to
battle for its own survival, without neither Islamic military campaigns nor any Latin assistance
from the West. According to Islamic legal theories of the Jihad, this step indicates that resort to
war followed an attempt to pursue legitimate goals by nonlethal means. 175 It seems possible to
state that in this particular case, the theory met the practice. This is neither to imply a moral
judgment regarding Nur-ad-Din’s intentions nor any temptations to center the Jihad ideology on
peace. Instead, it explains the existence of the just war procedures, which brought about almost
all Muslims into the struggle.
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